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CONNECTICUT YANKEE SPEECH IN EUROPE'S COURT: AN
ALTERNATIVE VISION OF CONSTITUTIONAL DEFAMATION
LAW TO NEW YoRK TIMES Co. V. SULLIVAN'?
Allen EdwardShoenberger*
I. INTRODUCTION

Americans can justly feel proud of their historic role in identifying
and promoting human rights, Guantanamo notwithstanding. The United
States Bill of Rights is one of the oldest effective legal protections of
human rights ever devised.
Moreover, Americans have been
instrumental in carrying such rights to the rest of the world. In the
eighteenth century, Thomas Paine took American conceptions of rights
to France,' and in the twentieth century, Eleanor Roosevelt helped
spread those same rights on the world stage by assisting the United
Nations General Assembly in drafting the International Bill of Human
Rights.'
That instrument was almost immediately followed by
protection of similar rights in the European Convention on Human
Rights.3 That convention currently protects the rights of over 800
million persons in Europe, covering forty-seven countries including
Russia.4 Its provisions are administered through the European Court of
*

Allen Edward Shoenberger, Professor of Law, Loyola University Chicago School of

Law.

1. Steven C. Perkins, Guide to ResearchingInternationalHuman Rights Law, 24 CASE
W. RES. J. INT'L L. 379, 380 (1992) ("In Europe, the concepts of the American Revolution
spread to France with Thomas Paine's writings: Common Sense and The Rights of Man. The
result in France was the Declaration of the Rights and Duties of the Citizen which was the
statement of the desires of the people in the French Revolution.").
2. Jorge Cicero, The Alien Tort Statute of 1789 as a Remedy for Injuries to Foreign
Nationals Hosted by the United States, 23 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REv. 315, 358 (1992) (noting
"Mrs. Eleanor Roosevelt's role as a protagonist in the drafting and adoption of the
International Bill of Human Rights").
3.
See S.I. Strong, Christian Constitutions: Do They Protect Internationally
Recognized Human Rights and Minimize the Potentialfor Violence Within a Society?, 29
CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 1, 49 (1997) (noting that the European Convention on Human Rights
contains similar rights as the Internal Bill of Human Rights).
4. Clara A. Dietel, Note, "Not Our Problem": Russia's Resistance to Joining the
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Human Rights. 5
Free speech, such as that exemplified by the speeches and

pamphlets of the revolutionary firebrand Thomas Paine, has been at the
center of American civil rights.6 Paine's speech jeopardized his neck,
both to the wrath of King George as well as the French mob. 7 Thomas
Burke thought Paine's pamphlet, the Rights of Man,8 so incendiary it

should expose Paine to the criminal justice laws of England. 9 The
enactment of the Sedition Act early in our constitutional history posed a
serious challenge in the form of criminal liability for speech.' 0 With the
expiration of the Sedition Act in 1801,11 the issue of criminal liability
for speech remained dormant for many years at the U.S. Supreme Court
level until criminal prosecutions during the First World War. 12
The law of civil defamation remained a matter shaped by state court
decisions until the groundbreaking 1964 decision of New York Times Co.
v. Sullivan.' 3

That decision constitutionalized large aspects of civil

defamation law. Sullivan held that public officials could neither be sued
nor sue for defamation except in the rarest of situations. 14 Such broad
Convention on Action Against Trafficking in Human Beings, 32 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L.
REV. 161, 171 (2008).
5.
Christian Tomuschat, The European Court of Human Rights Overwhelmed by
Applications: Problems and Possible Solutions, in THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN
RIGHTS OVERWHELMED BY APPLICATIONS: PROBLEMS AND POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS 1 (Rildiger
Wolfrum & Ulrike Deutcsh eds., 2009).
6. See generally HARVEY J. KAYE, THOMAS PAINE: FIREBRAND OF THE REVOLUTION
(2000).
7. See generally Mark Philp, Introduction to THOMAS PAINE, RIGHTS OF MAN,
COMMONE SENSE AND OTHER POLITICAL WRITINGS, at vii (Mark Philp ed., 1998).

8. THOMAS PAINE, Rights of Man, in RIGHTS OF MAN, COMMON SENSE AND OTHER
POLITICAL WRITINGS, supra note 7, at 83.
9. "If governments, as Mr. Burke asserts, are not founded on the Rights of Man, and
are founded on any rights at all, they consequently must be founded on the right of something
that is not man. What then is that something?" Id. at 248.
10. See generally MICHAEL KENT CURTIS, FREE SPEECH, "THE PEOPLE'S DARLING
PRIVILEGE": STRUGGLES FOR FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION IN AMERICAN HISTORY (2000).
11.
Anthony J. Bellia Jr. & Bradford R. Clark, The Federal Common Law of Nations,
109 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 54 (2009).
12. See Stewart Jay, The Creation of the First Amendment Right to Free Expression:
From the Eighteenth Century to the Mid-Twentieth Century, 34 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 773,
803 (2008) (noting that "[f]or most of the twentieth century... the Supreme Court... largely
ignored the period from the Sedition Act until World War I"). As an article by David
Pritchard reveals, criminal libel prosecutions are not as rare as had been assumed in the United
States. David Pritchard, Rethinking Criminal Libel: An Empirical Study, 14 COMM. L. &
POL'Y 303 (2009). For example, an empirical study in Wisconsin discovered sixty-one such
prosecutions over the period from 1991 to 2007. Id.at 305.
13. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
14. Id.at 279-80 (noting that "a public official [is prohibited] from recovering damages
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immunity to speech removed not only the opportunity for redress in the
form of civil damages,15 it also removed the opportunity to have judicial
and/or jury determinations to "clear the name" of a politician.
In recent times, the results of such broad immunity are varied. It
encouraged inter alia: the "Swiftboating" of a war hero, John Kerry, by
allegations of military incompetency;' 6 multiple allegations of
improprieties by Governor Sarah Palin, a vice presidential candidate,
costing her more than a half million dollars in legal fees, and possibly
contributing to Ms. Palin's resignation; 17 the publication of a book, Lies
and the Lying Liars Who Tell Them: A Fairand Balanced Look at the
Right, by a subsequent successful candidate for the United States
Senate;' 8 and persistent attacks on the legitimacy of President Obama's
Hawaiian birth certificate. 19 More generally, Obama has been attacked
for:
[P]lotting to set up "death panels," government tribunals authorized to
euthanize the old and sick. Obama was born in Kenya and therefore his very
Presidency is unconstitutional. Obama will cut Medicare benefits to provide
coverage to illegal aliens. Obama seeks to indoctrinate children in Marxist
ideology and put teenagers
in "reeducations camps." Obama is a Communist.
20
Obama is a Fascist.

The thesis of this article is that the rules of Sullivan should be
reexamined in light of the current framework of flaming political debate
on both old and new media. While speech itself may sometimes be a
corrective for untrue speech, defamation lawsuits also have an
appropriate role, as they have for more than 160 years under the U.S.
Constitution.
for a defamatory falsehood relating to his official conduct unless he proves that the statement
was made with 'actual malice').
15. Id. at 277.
16. FactCheck.org, Republican-funded Group Attacks Kerry's War Record,
http://www.factcheck.org/republican-funded__group-attacks kerrys-war record.html
(last
visited Oct. 15, 2009) (noting an attack ad that featured veterans who claim Kerry "lied" to get
Vietnam medals. But other witnesses disagreed, and so did Navy records).
17.
GLOBE,
18.

See Associated Press, Palin Spars with Critics over Ethics Charges, BOSTON

June 22, 2009, at 2.
AL FRANKEN, LIES (AND THE LYING LIARS WHO TELL THEM): A FAIR AND

BALANCED LOOK AT THE RIGHT (2003). Al Franken, a well-known comedian, is now the

junior U.S. Senator from Minnesota.
19.

See

Brian

Montopoli,

Who

are

the

Birthers?

(July

23,

2009),

http://www.cbsnews.com/blogs/2009/07/23/politics/politicalhotsheetentry5l82746.shtml.
20.

Hendrik Hertzberg, Comment, The Talk of the Town, NEW YORKER, Sept. 21, 2009,

at 33.
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In particular, the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR), the
constitutional court for Europe, has developed a wealth of jurisprudence
relating to the constitutionalization of defamation law, and found it
unnecessary to resort to the blanket immunity carved out in Sullivan.
Yet the ECHR has drawn lines that offer adequate, appropriate
protections for political speech, protections that balance the rights of the
public to hear with the rights of a politician to seek redress for flagrant,
defamatory falsehoods.
Moreover, reconsideration of defamation law is particularly timely
today, for defamation has reemerged on the international stage.
Defamation law assumed enhanced importance when, on March 26,
2009, a coalition of Muslim countries secured the adoption of a
resolution combating "defamation of religions., 2 1 What speech deserves
protection and what speech appropriately should be the basis for either
civil or criminal sanctions are today very important questions. As
Thomas Paine wrote:
The circumstances of the world are continually changing, and the opinions of
men change also; and as government is for the living, and not for the dead, it is
the living only that has any right in it. That which may be thought right and
found convenient in one age, may be thought wrong and found inconvenient
in
22
another. In such cases, Who is to decide, the living, or the dead?

It is also important, however, to consider the potential ranges of
sanctions that may be imposed for speech. Civil damages, criminal jail
sentences, and injunctions preventing the publication of books or giving
of speeches are all possible sanctions. Jail sentences, as will be seen

21. Laura Maclnnis, U.N. Body Adopts Resolution on Religious Defamation, REUTERS,
Mar.
26,
2009,
available
at
http://www.reuters.com/article/worldNews/idUSTRE52P60220090326. As the article points
out:
The U.N. Human Rights Council adopted the non-binding text, proposed by
Pakistan on behalf of Islamic states, with a vote of 23 states in favor and 1 against,
with 13 abstentions. Western governments and a broad alliance of activist groups
have voiced dismay about the religious defamation text, which adds to recent
efforts to broaden the concept of human rights to protect communities of believers
rather than individuals.
Id.
Although the Rights Council is virtually powerless compared to the United Nations
Security Council, its "decisions carry considerable symbolic weight, particularly in the
developing world." Associated Press, US. Takes Its Seat on UN Rights Council, BOSTON
GLOBE, Sept. 15, 2009, at 3.
22. PAINE, supra note 8, at 95.
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below, are frequently meted out in Europe. Large damage awards are
possible both in Europe and in the United States. Injunctive relief has
been ordered in many European cases, but rare in the United States.
This Article will address the different remedial modalities herein.
Moreover, this Article will discuss the different approach adopted
by the ECHR towards civil servants as distinct from elected politicians.
This approach may facilitate greater opportunities for "mere" civil
servants to protect their reputation through civil damage recovery in
contrast to far more limited recovery prospects for politicians who
arguably have opened themselves up to more robust criticism.
In addition, the article will review the ECHR jurisprudence that
allows more latitude for recovery for statements of opinion, at least in
situations in which the opinion has no firm grounding in facts, and
suggests that American courts might similarly permit scrutiny and
remedies for "unsupported opinion."
Lastly, this Article considers the danger of concepts such as
"defamation" of religion.
II. ERECTION OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL WALL AGAINST DEFAMATION
SUITS BY PUBLIC OFFICIALS: AN INTRODUCTORY COMPARISON WITH

ECHR JURISPRUDENCE
In New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, the United States Supreme
Court, for the first time, constitutionalized defamation law for public
officials or public figures.23 The Sullivan decision required proof of
''actual malice" before allowing a public official to recover damages for
a defamatory falsehood relating to his official conduct.2 4 The Court

23. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). In the 19th century, the
Court, in one of the few defamation cases it heard that century, considered the common law of
defamation. White v. Nicholls, 44 U.S. 266 (1845). The allegedly defamatory publications:
[Dienounced General Harrison as "the nominee of the bank whig federalist,
abolitionist and anti-masons," "an abolitionist of fraud and concealment," as being
guilty of pursuing a course "grossly insulting to common sense, honesty, and
decency, by shrouding himself in darkness," "of courting dangerous fanatics, and
countenancing them (abolitionists) in their mad warfare upon our peace, our
property, and our lives."
Id. at 268-69. The particulars of the case involve the removal from office of Robert White,
the collector of customs for the port of the District of Columbia. See id. at 266. The
nineteenth century was obviously familiar with stinging political invective, as the White case
illustrates. The decision of the Supreme Court, however, discussed no constitutional issue,
but solely sounded in the common law of defamation. See id. at 284-92.
24. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 279-80.
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defined actual malice as knowledge that the publication was false or
published with reckless disregard for whether it was false or not.25
Subsequent decisions extended the holding of Sullivan to apply to
"public figures.'2 6 The practical impact of Sullivan is that it is virtually
impossible for a public official to bring a successful defamation action,
regardless of the outrageous nature of whatever has been said. 27In recent
years, the U.S. Supreme Court has heard few defamation cases.
By contrast, defamation cases routinely reach the ECHR, the
highest volume human rights court in the world.28 That court's active
defamation jurisprudence is the ultimate arbiter of the limits of free
speech for the 800 million persons who live within the forty-seven
member countries of the Council of Europe. 29 The decisions of that
court have also "constitutionalized" large parts of defamation law
throughout most of the continent of Europe. The ECHR applies the
European Convention on Human Rights to the various defamation laws
of the member states of the Council of Europe. 30 That jurisprudence,
however, has adopted no doctrine similar to the "actual malice" standard
of Sullivan, yet, as will be seen by the cases considered below, the court
adequately protects the interests of both the public and public officials.
It is worth comparing ECHR defamation jurisprudence with that of

25.

Id.

26. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 342-43 (1974). Gertz was an attorney
representing the family of a victim of a police shooting retained to bring a civil action against
the police officer. Id.at 323.
27. The last defamation-related decision by the Supreme Court was the brief decision of
Troy v. Cochran, 544 U.S. 734 (2005). In Troy, however, the Court considered it
inappropriate for it to explore petitioners' basic claims about the issuance of a permanent
injunction in a defamation case or the lack of appropriate tailoring for the relief because of the
death of the petitioner Johnnie Cochran. Id. at 737-3 8. The next previous case implicating a
defamation action was Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681 (1997), where the Court allowed a civil
action to go forward against President Clinton. The most recent cases of substance regarding
defamation date from the early 1990s. See Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc. 501 U.S.
496 (1991); Siegert v. Gilley, 500 U.S. 226 (1991); Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S.
1(1990).
28. Allen E. Shoenberger, Messages from Strasbourg: Lessons for American Courts
from the Highest Volume Human Rights Court in the World-The European Court of Human
Rights, 27 WHITTIER L. REv. 357, 358 (2005).
29. Tomuschat, supra note 5, at I (noting that "the jurisdiction of the European Court of
Human Rights ... extends to 47 states with more than 800 million inhabitants"). The member
countries of the European Union are all included, but additional member countries include
both Turkey and Russia. Dietel, supra note 4, at 171 n.56.
30. Tomuschat, supra note 5, at 1. The European Convention on Human Rights owes
its direct intellectual heritage to the United States Constitution's Bill of Rights. See
Shoenberger, supranote 28, at 359-60.
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the U.S. Supreme Court because democracy is an explicit condition for
countries seeking membership in the Council of Europe. 31 Thus, one
might expect that a European "take" on defamation laws might better
inform U.S. citizens, lawyers, and courts as to the nature of appropriate
defamation law in democracies.
There are both similarities and differences that emerge from such
comparisons, including, in particular, the ECHR: 1) permits statements
of opinion without adequate factual basis to be actionable as not
inconsistent with free speech; 32 2) draws distinctions between elected
and nonelected public officials; 33 3) routinely deals with criminal
defamation laws, laws which are assumed to be completely
unconstitutional in the United States; 34 and 4) itself determines the facts
of a free speech case, instead of deferring to lower court fact-finding.35
A. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan: A Short Summary
The New York Times published "a full-page [editorial]
advertisement," entitled "Heed Their Rising Voices" on March 29,
1960.36 The text described "wave[s] of terror" faced by "Southern
Negro students... engaged in widespread non-violent demonstrations in
positive affirmation of the right to live in human dignity as guaranteed
by the U.S. Constitution and the Bill of Rights. 37 The advertisement
"concluded with an appeal for funds for three purposes: support of the
student movement, 'the struggle for the right-to-vote,' and the legal
defense of Dr. Martin Luther King Jr., leader of the movement, against a
perjury indictment then pending in Montgomery [Alabama]. 38 The
advertisement's text, along with a line reading "We in the south who are

31. See COUNCIL OF EUROPE, CONVENTION FOR THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS
AND FUNDAMENTAL FREEDOMS 2 (2003) (stating that members of the Council of Europe
must "[r]eaffirm[] their profound belief in those fundamental freedoms which are the

foundation of justice and peace in the world and are best maintained . . . by an effective
political democracy"). One might admit that the democratic elements within the various
nation states of the Council of Europe may not always be as fully developed, as one would
wish, particularly when one considers that Russia is now a member.
32.
33.
34.

See infra Part III.B.
See infra Part IV.F.
See infra Part III.D.

35. In a way analogous to the rarely applicable "Constitutional Fact Doctrine" as
articulated by the United States Supreme Court. See infra note 52 and accompanying text.
36. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 256 (1964).
37. Id.
38. Id. at 257.

HeinOnline -- 28 QLR 437 2009-2010

QUINNIPIAC LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 28:431

struggling daily for dignity and freedom warmly
endorse this appeal,"
39
appeared over the names of twenty individuals.
One of the elected commissioners of the City of Montgomery
brought a libel suit against the New York Times alleging that there were
various inaccuracies in the advertisement and that he had been injured,
even though he was not named in the advertisement. 40 A jury awarded
him the full amount claimed, $500,000.41 Although it was uncontested
that the advertisement contained some inaccuracies (for example, the
students had sung the National Anthem not My Country Tis of Thee, and
Dr. King had not been arrested seven times, but only four times), the
commissioner made no effort at trial to prove any "actual pecuniary loss
as a result of the alleged libel. 42 Neither the New York Times nor
additional signatories to the advertisement made any effort to confirm
the accuracy of the advertisement by either checking with recent
published Times articles or other means.43
The trial judge instructed the jury that "the statements in the
advertisement were 'libelous per se' and were not privileged, so that
[defendants] might be held liable if... the statements were made 'of and
concerning' [the plaintiff]." 4 Furthermore, the trial judge instructed
"that, because the statements were libelous per se, 'the law.. . implies
legal injury from the bare fact of publication itself" and general
damages are presumed and need not be proved.4 5 In addition, the jury
was instructed that it could award punitive damages, which "requires
proof of actual malice under Alabama law," but that a showing of "mere
negligence or carelessness is not evidence of actual malice., 46 The
judge refused to charge that actual intent to harm or gross negligence
and recklessness must be demonstrated, and declined to require the jury
to distinguish between compensatory damages and punitive damages.4 7

39.

Id.

40.

Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 256-58.

41. ld. at256.
42. Id. at 257-60. "Approximately 394 copies of the edition of the [New York] Times
containing the advertisement were distributed in Alabama. Of these, about 35 copies were
distributed in Montgomery County." Id. at 260 n.3.
43. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 260-61.
44. Id. at 262.
45. Id. (omission in original).
46. Id.
47. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 261. The Court noted:
Alabama law denies a public official recovery of punitive damages in a libel action
brought on account of a publication concerning his official conduct unless he first
makes a written demand for a public retraction and the defendant fails or refuses to
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The Supreme Court determined that Alabama law was
"constitutionally deficient for failure to provide the [adequate]
safeguards for freedom of speech and of the press that are required by
the First and Fourteenth Amendment in a libel action brought by a public
official against critics of his official conduct., 48 The Court went on to
"hold that under the proper safeguards the evidence ... in this case

[was] constitutionally insufficient to support the judgment
respondent. 4 9
The Court announced:

for

[A] federal rule that prohibits a public official from recovering damages for a
defamatory falsehood relating to his official conduct unless he proves that the
statement was made with 'actual malice'-that is, with knowledge
that it was
50
false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not.

This rule is probably the most remembered component of the
Sullivan decision, for it is indeed the core of the opinion.
The Court went on, however, to make two other significant
determinations. First, the court held that a presumption of general
damages was "inconsistent with the federal rule., 51 Second, the court
reviewed the evidence itself, an unusual exercise for an American
appellate court, 52 and determined that the proof presented lacked the
convincing clarity that the constitution demands for a finding of actual
malice.5 3 The Article will refer to this holding as the Constitutional Fact

comply ....Respondent [the commissioner] served such a demand upon each of
the petitioners.... The Times did not publish a retraction ...but wrote respondent
a letter stating, among other things, that "we ...are somewhat puzzled as to how
you think the statements in any way reflect on you."
Id.(fourth omission in original). The commissioner filed suit days later without responding to
the Time's inquiry. Id. Time published a retraction of the advertisement on the demand of
the Governor of Alabama "who asserted that the publication charged him with 'grave
misconduct and... improper actions and omissions as Governor. "' Id.(omission in original).
48. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 264.
49. id.at 264-65.
50.

Id.at 279-80.

51. Id.at 283-84. The failure to require the jury to separate the award between general
damages and punitive damages (for punitive damages Alabama law required proof of actual
malice), meant that it was impossible to know whether the award was wholly an award of one
or the other. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 284. Because of this uncertainty, the Court reversed and
remanded the case. Id.
52. Such an exercise by the Supreme Court has been described as the Constitutional
Fact Doctrine. See PETER L. STRAUSS ET AL., GELLHORN AND BYSE'S ADMINISTRATIVE
LAW, 973-78 (10th ed. 2003).
53. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 285-86.
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determination.54
In rejecting the possibility of a finding of actual malice, the court
made two independent points. First, nowhere in the evidence was the
good faith of the New York Times impeached.55 The Times' Secretary
had testified that "apart from the padlocking allegation . . . the
advertisement was 'substantially correct.' 56 At most, the court
determined that there was "negligence in failing to discover the
misstatements, and this [was] constitutionally insufficient to show the
recklessness that is required for a finding of actual malice., 57 Second,
the court determined that, at most, the advertisement was a libel on the
government, not a personal criticism of the commissioner (who was
never named in the advertisement). 58
The second holding of Sullivan has not attracted much attention
over the intervening years, which is not surprising, considering the
radical change wrought by the decision to American libel law by the
requirement of narrowly defined "actual malice." Nor did the two
separate opinions joined by three Justices attract much attentionalthough both opinions took the position that no defamation actions
should be constitutionally permitted when official conduct of public
officials is criticized.5 9
Other issues raised, but not decided in Sullivan, also deserve some
attention. For example, the court explicitly refused to decide "how far
down into the lower ranks of government employees the 'public official'
designation would extend.",60
Sullivan dealt with an elected city
commissioner, clearly a public official. 6 1 The Court also declined to

54. The Supreme Court has stated:
[I]n cases raising First Amendment issues ... an appellate court has an obligation
to make an independent examination of the whole record inorder to make sure that
the judgment does not constitute a forbidden intrusion on the field of free
expression.... The question whether the evidence in the record in a defamation
case is sufficient to support a finding of actual malice is a question of law.
Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1, 17 (1990) (first omission in original) (citations

omitted) (internal quotations omitted).
55.

Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 286.

56.
57.
58.

Id
Id.at 287-88.
Id.at 288-92.

59. Justice Black (with Justice Douglas) wrote one opinion, and Justice Goldberg (with
Justice Douglas) authored the other opinion concurring with the result. Sullivan, 376 U.S at
293-305.
60. Id.at 284 n.23.

61.

Id.at 256.
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' 62
explore the boundaries of "official conduct."

B. The European Court ofHuman Rights
The ECHR consists of judges from each of the forty-seven member
states of the Council of Europe (virtually every European country is a
member, including in particular Turkey and Russia).63

The judges are

appointed to serve in their individual capacities, and not as
representatives of the nation states. 64 The court ordinarily sits in one of
five different chambers consisting of seven judges. 65 In more important
cases, or in certain cases involving an appeal from an ordinary chamber,
the court sits in a Grand Chamber of seventeen judges.66 A Committee
of Ministers of the Council of Europe administers the court's
decisions. 67 Awards of money damages and costs are routinely
complied with in a timely fashion, 68 Decisions that require significant
changes to the law of one of the contracting states often take longer,
sometimes years to accomplish.69 In recent years, the chambers of the
court have decided more than a thousand cases per year, more than ten

62. Id. at 284 n.23.
63. See EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS, ANNUAL REPORT 2007, at 14 (2008),
available
at
http://www.echr.coe.int/ECHR/EN/Header/Reports+and+Statistics/Reports/Annua+Reports
(follow "2007" hyperlink); Dietel, supranote 4, at 171 n.56.
64. EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 63, at 14.
65. Id. at 14-15.
66. Id. at 15.
67. Id. at 16.
68. Thirty-six percent of monetary damage awards were paid within the deadlines
expiring in 2008 and another five-percent were paid after the deadline. COUNCIL OF EUROPE
COMMITTEE OF MINISTERS, SUPERVISION OF THE EXECUTION OF JUDGMENTS OF THE

EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS: ANNUAL REPORT 57 (2008), available at
http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/execution/default-en.asp (follow "Annual Report 2008"
hyperlink) [hereinafter ANNUAL REPORT]. Seven of the forty-seven member countries had
more than fifty outstanding cases accounting for seventy-six percent of the unpaid judgments.
Id. Turkey, Romania, Ukraine, and Italy had the largest number of outstanding unpaid cases.
Id.
69.
For a general discussion of the execution of the court's judgments, see Council of
Europe,
Frequently
Asked
Questions,
http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/execution/Presentation/FAQ-en.asp
(last visited Feb.
27, 2010). For a general discussion of the execution of judgments, including just satisfaction
and other individual measures such as measures to prevent the reoccurance of similar
violations of the convention and possible sanctions for non-compliance, see CLARE OVEY &
ROBIN WHITE, JACOBS AND WHITE, THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 437-

54 (3d ed. 2002). For an incredibly detailed report of the status of judgments, see ANNUAL
REPORT, supra note 68.
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times the number of cases the United States Supreme Court decides on
the merits each year. 70
The ECHR enforces the European Convention for the Protection of
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, drafted in Rome in 1950.71
III. DEFAMATION IN THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS

A. The ECHR Applies a Defamation Shield to Cases Brought by Private
Corporations.Reports of Rumor Protected
In a rather mundane political graft case, a case in which various
public officials (mostly communists) were assigned personal luxury cars,
paid for, indeed, over-paid for, by public money, the ECHR held that
defamation actions against the investigative reporter and newspaper
were improper. 72 Moreover, the ECHR applied free speech protections
in an action brought by a private corporation against a newspaper and a
reporter.73 Neither the government nor any governmental official
brought the defamation action.74 (It is particularly interesting to
consider that in the United States such a defamation action would not
necessarily be covered by the Sullivan rule. 75) The case, however, well
illustrates the typical mode of analysis utilized by the ECHR.
In Timpul Info-Magazin v. Moldova,76 a newspaper and a journalist
(Ms. Alina Anghel) lodged an application against the Moldovan
Government related to a defamation action brought by two private
70. Compare EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 63, at 149 (finding that
that the ECHR has decided a total of 9031 cases between 1955 and 2007, including: 1105
cases in 2005, 1560 in 2006, and 1503 cases in 2007), and Shoenberger, supra note 28, at 358
(listing number of cases decided by the ECHR between 1960 and 2004), with Margaret
Meriwether Cordray & Richard Cordray, The Supreme Court'sPlenary Docket, 58 WASH. &
LEE L. REV. 737 (2001) (discussing the number of cases heard by the United States Supreme
Court and how this number has declined).
71. EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 63, at 11. The original text has
now been significantly amended in procedural aspects by Protocol No. 11, effective in 1998.
Id. For the contracting parties (i.e. the forty-seven nation states of Europe who are now

members of the Council of Europe) see Dietel, supra note 4, at 171 n.56.
72. Timpul Info-Magazin v. Moldova, App. No. 42864/05 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Nov. 27,
2007), http://www.echr.coe.int.
73.
74.
75.

See id.
1, 19.
See id. 1.
In its decision of Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of United States, Inc., 466 U.S.

485, 513 (1984), the Supreme Court assumed that the Sullivan actual malice standard was
applicable to an action by a private corporation against a non-governmental related consumer
organization. It never decided that it was applicable. Id.
76. App. No. 42864/05 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Nov. 27, 2007), http://www.echr.coe.int.
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corporations in which the Moldovan court ordered the assets of the
newspaper frozen.77 The newspaper published an article titled "Luxury
in the Land of Poverty," examining the relationship between State
authorities and a private investment fund and its management
company.78 The focus was on the purchase of luxury cars without
making details public.79 Only after the publication did the government
acknowledge that the deal had taken place. 80 Of the forty-two cars
purchased, thirty-two were distributed to the governors of regions of
Moldova, thirty-one of whom were communists. 8 1
The article
questioned whether the purchases were a means for increasing the ability
to spread communist propaganda for forthcoming
elections and
82
levels.
state
highest
the
at
corruption
of
illustrative
On the date a defamation action was brought against a newspaper
and a journalist by the two private corporations (including a request for
an injunction) the court ordered that the newspaper's assets were to be
frozen.83
The newspaper's equipment was sequestered and bank
accounts actually frozen within two weeks.84 The journalist received
threatening phone calls.85 She was later attacked outside of her house by
unidentified persons and suffered a blow to her head and arm with a
metal bar. 86 Both the shuttered newspaper and other media linked the
attack to the article at dispute as well as the journalist's investigation of
a luxury car offered as a gift by the
President of one of the corporations
87
to the Minister of Internal Affairs.
The trial court rejected a defense that the article dealt with a matter
of important public interest: public money had been utilized, but not
through the public agency for making such purchases, nor was the
expenditure planned for in the state budget for 2003.88 The court also
rejected the argument that the statements were value judgments not
susceptible of proof or opinions about a well-known politician and

77.
78.
79.
80.
81.

Id.
l, 9.
Id. 7.
Id.
Timpul Info-Magazin, App. No. 42864/05,
Id. 8.

82.

Id.

83.
84.
85.

Id. 9.
Timpul Info-Magazin, App. No. 42864/05
Id. 11.

7.

10.

86. Id.
87. Id.
88.

Timpul Info-Magazin, App. No. 42864/05

12, 14.
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simply reported clearly identified rumors.8 9 The court also rejected an
argument that the private corporations had become90 "public persons" by
entering into the transactions with the government.
The court cited one fragment of a paragraph from the article as a
factual representation that did not correspond to reality:
[W]hen the communists came to power, Vladimir Voronin wanted to cut the
Gordian knot of the investment fund [one of the plaintiff corporations]...
founded on the basis of investment bonds, that is he was picking at it. They
say thatlin order for this not to happen, someone paid someone else 500,000
dollars.

It is clear that the Moldovan court interpreted this statement as an
allegation that a bribe had been paid. The court then awarded the
plaintiffs 95,725 Euro, 92 a judgment that was upheld in the Chisinau
Court of Appeal, 93 but reduced in amount by the Supreme Court of
Justice to 8430 Euro. 9 4 The Supreme Court found the article alleged 95a
bribe had been paid, and thus a criminal offense had been committed.
It also determined, however, that "a restriction on freedom of expression
should not be of such a degree as to put in jeopardy the economic
survival of the person sanctioned., 96 Each appellate court rejected the
newspaper's defense that the article had been based upon rumors, which
the paper had called ill-informed, and had explicitly
stated the
97
true.
were
rumors
the
whether
know
not
did
newspaper
The European Court of Human Rights considered the Timpul InfoMagazin case in the light of Article 10 of the European Convention on
Human Rights 98 which provides:
1. Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right shall include
freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas

89.
90.
91.

Id. 12.
Id.
Id. 13 (internal quotations omitted).

92. Timpul Info-Magazin, App. No. 42864/05
14. The trial court also ordered that an
apology be published by the newspaper. Id It is unclear when the newspaper's equipment
was released from sequestration.
93. Id. 17. The Court of Appeals refused to lift the restriction on the newspaper's
property since that request had been rejected and no appeal had been taken. Id.
94. Timpul Info-Magazin, App. No. 42864/05 N 19.

95.
96.
97.

Id.
Id.
Id.
T16.

98.

Timpul Info-Magazin, App. No. 42864/05

21.
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without interference by public authority and regardless of frontiers. This
article shall not prevent States from requiring the licensing of broadcasting,
television or cinema enterprises.
2. The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it duties and
responsibilities, may be subject to such formalities, conditions, restrictions or
penalties as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society, in
the interests of national security, territorial integrity or public safety, for the
prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, for the
protection of the reputation or rights of others, for preventing the disclosure of
information received in confidence,
or for maintaining the authority and
99
impartiality of the judiciary.

The court noted that it was conceded that the award of damages
constituted an "interference by [a] public authority with the applicant
newspaper's right to freedom of expression under the first paragraph of
Article 10," and that such interference constituted a "violation of Article
10 unless it is prescribed by law, has an aim or aims that are legitimate
under paragraph 2 of the Article [10] and is necessary in a democratic
society to achieve such aim or aims." 100 The court determined that the
interference was prescribed by law and served a legitimate aim of
protecting the corporation's reputation.' 01
The court then considered whether the action was "necessary in a
democratic society" and held it was not. 102 First, the court reiterated its
position that "a possible failure of a public figure to observe laws and
regulations aimed at protecting serious public interests, even in the
private sphere, may . . . constitute a matter of legitimate public
interest."' 10 3 The court stated that particularly strong justifications were
required for any measure affecting the press and limiting the right to
information that the public has a right to obtain when political matters or

99. COUNCIL OF EUROPE, supra, note 31, at 7; see also Timpul Info-Magazin, App. No.
42864/05, 21.
100. Timpul Info-Magazin, App. No. 42864/05, T 26 (alternation in original) (internal

quotations omitted).
101. Id. 27-28.
102. Id. 29-40.
103. Id 30 (internal quotations omitted). The court cited two earlier decisions (Fressoz
v. France, 1999-I Eur. Ct. H.R. 1, 22, 50 and Haukom v. Norway, App. No. 510/04, Eur.
H.R. Rep. 889, 919, 87 (2008)) to support this finding. Timpul Info-Magazin, App. No.
42864/05 30. In both cases, criminal cases had been brought against publishers of articles
about private persons: in the latter case the chairman of an automobile company undergoing
labor unrest, in the former case an executive vice-president of one of the country's largest
industrial companies and a famous singer. Fressoz, 1999-I Eur. Ct. H.R. at 22, 50; Haukom,
46 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 919, 87.
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other matters of public interest are involved.' 04
The court itself considered the article's substance and rejected the
allegation by the Government that the article intended to attack the
corporation's reputation and affect fair competition rules. 105 Instead, the
ECHR construed the article as criticizing the government for a nontransparent, wasteful manner of spending public money, a matter of
general public concern, rather than disparaging the company.'0 6 The
corporation had not charged that any other contents in the article had
been untrue, and, in particular, did not claim there had been competitive
bidding or deny that the cars were overpriced.' 07
The ECHR determined that "the Government [had] relied on a part
of a sentence [in the article] taken out of context in order to show that
the interference with the applicant newspaper's rights had been
necessary."' 1 8 When considered in context, however, the article warned
the reader about the unreliable character of the rumor on which it was
reporting. 109 In its role as a public watchdog, media reports on stories or
rumors are "to be protected where they are not completely without
foundation."' 10 The newspaper had attempted to get information about
the transaction from both the Government and the private company but
had been unable to do so."' The ECHR opined that other uncontested
facts "could reasonably have prompted the journalist to report ' on
12
anything that was available, including unconfirmed rumours.
Moreover, it noted that "the article was written in the context of a
forthcoming election and that [the article] both discussed the possible
political reason for the purchase of the cars and expressly urged the
voters to punish, during the election, those in power responsible for
State-level corruption.""'
The ECHR determined that the article was
political speech critical of the government, expression of which
implicates wider permissible criticism limits." 4
Considering the
seriousness of the fine, the newspaper's good faith reporting of an issue

104.

Timpul Info-Magazin, App. No. 42864/05,

105.
106.
107.

Id. 32.
Id.
Id.

108.

Timpul Info-Magazin, App. No. 42864/05,

109.

Id.

110.

Id. 36.

111.

Id.

31.

35.

112.

Timpul Info-Magazin, App. No. 42864/05,

113.

Id. 38.

114.

Id. (citing Castells v. Spain, 236 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1992)).

36.
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of genuine public interest, the factual background and lack of details
about the transaction between the private corporation and the
government, and the failure of the domestic courts to consider any of
these elements in their opinions, the ECHR determined that the
interference was not necessary in a democratic society and thus a
violation of Article 10.115
The court then awarded the newspaper damages of 12,000 Euro,
and costs and expenses of 1800 Euro. 116 This was sufficient to remove
the sting of the fine but rather modest, considering the seizure of the
newspaper's equipment.
Jurisprudence of the ECHR thus establishes that defamation actions
by private entities implicate free speech concerns, at least if matters
involving the government are implicated. In that context, the court
announced its willingness to tolerate reports based on rumor, at least
after attempts to elicit factual responses had been frustrated. What is
also interesting is that the ECHR itself evaluated, in fair detail, the
alleged defamatory statement, its context, and, after that evaluation,
found the speech protected. In making that determination, while the
court did mention that the State's courts had not referenced certain
matters in their opinions, the fact that the ECHR exercised its own
independent judgment is obvious.
While the court did find good faith on behalf of the newspaper, the
court did not apply any test that smacked of the actual malice test of
Sullivan.117 Instead, the court exemplified the second holding of
Sullivan, the application of a "constitutional fact" test. The ECHR, just
as the U.S. Supreme Court in Sullivan, itself examined the underlying
facts of the publication, and turned its decision upon the basis of its own
appreciation of those facts. There is little, if any, sense of deference to
the decisions of the nation state's courts. 118 Even disavowal of the truth

of a statement does not exculpate a republisher.1 1 9 Also worth noting is
115. Id.
40-41.
116.
Timpul Info-Magazin, App. No. 42864/05,
46, 52. The Supreme Court of Justice
had reduced the original award to 8430 Euro. Id. 19.
117. Knowledge that a statement was untrue or reckless disregard of whether it was true
or not. See New York Times, Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
118. Implicit in that consideration is rejection of the American rule that a republication of
a defamatory statement makes the republisher just as culpable as the originator of the
statement.

See E. GABRIEL PERLE ET AL., PERLE & WILLIAMS ON PUBLISHING LAW § 5.10

n.201 (3d ed. Supp. 2002) (citing Cepeda v. Cowles Magazines & Broad., Inc., 328 F.2d 869,
871 (9th Cir. 1964); Carson v. Allied News Co., 529 F.2d 206 (7th Cir. 1976)).
119. Id. "However, because of the decisions in New York Times and Gertz, which
require fault as a prerequisite for liability, the mere fact that one has republished a defamation
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the recognition by the ECHR that the article in question implicated
political speech, speech related to an election and the criticism of
government. Such speech is considered at the core of First Amendment
protection. It was the nature of the speech, rather than the nature of the
parties, that drove the ECHR's consideration.
Such factual analysis of defamation cases by the ECHR is typical,
not atypical, of its approach. On occasion, to be sure, references occur
to a "margin of appreciation"-code words for a degree of deference to
the laws and courts of the nation states-but such references occur
relatively infrequently. There was such a reference in Timpul InfoMagazin: "[t]he State therefore enjoys a margin of appreciation as to the
means it provides under domestic law to enable a company to challenge
the truth, and limit the damage, of allegations which risk harming its
reputation." 120 Such deference did not stop the court from evaluating the
facts of the case itself, nor did the court distinctly apply the concept of
margin of appreciation to the judicial determinations of the Timpul InfoMagazin courts.
Since defamation cases ordinarily involve a published or
broadcasted message, a reviewing court is in a unique position to
evaluate the facts of such cases. Only rarely is credibility of a live
witness very significant in defamation cases '2-the typical question
is
122
whether the complained of publication is defamatory in its content.

cannot be the only consideration. The re-publisher's degree of fault must also be examined."
Id. § 5.10; see Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 339-40 (1974) ("However
pernicious an opinion may seem, we depend for its correction not on the conscience of judges
and juries but on the competition of other ideas. But there is no constitutional value in false
statements of fact.") (footnote omitted); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 566 cmt. a
(1977). Under the common law, an expression of opinion that was sufficiently derogatory
was actionable. Id.at § 501 cmt. c. This common law rule appears to have been abrogated as
unconstitutional. See id. Only if the expression of opinion implies the existence of
undisclosed facts, which are themselves defamatory, would the opinion statement be
actionable. See id.
120. Timpul Info-Magazin, App. No. 42864/05, 33.
121.
On occasion additional evidence is necessary to demonstrate that a statement is
defamatory. In cases in which a statement is not defamatory on its face, but takes on
defamatory meaning because of extrinsic facts, the plaintiff is required to plead extrinsic facts,
which are known as "inducement." Conroy v. Kilzer, 789 F. Supp. 1457, 1461 n.2 (D. Minn.
1992).
122. But see Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of U.S., Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 519 (1984)
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting) ("[I]t seems to me that [an actual malice determination] just as
often... is made ... on the basis of an evaluation of the credibility of the testimony of the
author of the defamatory statement.").
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B. UnsupportedOpinions May be Actionable in Defamation
The ECHR has distinguished between statements of fact and value
judgments, recognizing that the truth of value judgments is not
susceptible of proof, but it did not stop there. 23 The ECHR has stated
"[t]he requirement to prove the truth of a value judgment is impossible
to fulfill and infringes freedom of opinion itself," but it went on to state,
"[h]owever, even where a statement amounts to a value judgment, the
proportionality of an interference may depend on whether there exists a
sufficient factual basis for the impugned statement, since even a value
12 4
judgment without any factual basis to support it may be excessive."
The ECHR asserts:
In exercising its supervisory jurisdiction, the Court must "look at the
interference [by the government] in the light of the case as a whole, including
the content of the remarks held against the applicant and the context .... In
particular, it must determine whether the interference in issue was
"proportionate to the legitimate aims pursued" and whether the reasons
125
adduced by the national authorities to justify it are "relevant and sufficient."
In doing so, the ECHR must "satisfy itself that the national
authorities applied standards which were in conformity with the
principles embodied in [Article] 10 and . . . that they based themselves
on an acceptable assessment of the relevant facts."' 126 In asserting its
duty to explore the facts of the case as assessed by the national
authorities, the ECHR represents that it will routinely apply its own
constitutional fact analysis in cases dealing with speech and press

issues. 127
In Busuioc v. Moldova, 28 the ECHR considered, on a statement-bystatement basis, whether expressions of opinion were each adequately
justified by the journalist who had been found responsible for civil
defamation129 and ordered to pay modest damages of 224 3Euro. 30 For
example, in two instances, a reference to a "shady deal"' ' was found

123.

Busuioc v. Moldova, App. No. 61513/00, 42 Eur. H.R. Rep. 252, 267,

124.
125.
126.

Id.

127.
128.
129.
130.
131.

Busuioc, 42 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 267,
42 Eur. H.R. Rep. 252 (2006).
Id.at 259-62,
14-28, 36.
Id.at 273, 100.
Id. at260-61, 25.

Id. qT,62.
Id
62.
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adequately justified by the fact that the transaction referenced was
suspected of being illegal, and a Parliamentary Commission made a
report to the same effect. 132 In another instance, the court determined
that "expressions such as 'colourful figure,' 'the head of the Airport's
Staff Unit would puzzle even an employee of the staff unit of any
penitentiary' and 'adventures of this unrestrained civil servant"' which
had been held defamatory by the national court, were opinion or value
133
judgments with adequate factual bases for the opinions expressed.
Since each of these expressions were employed in regard to a debate on
an issue of public interest, including allegations that a Head of Staff had
engaged in sexual harassment, drunkenness, and abuse of an official car
(of which the court did
not make any assessment),134 these expressions
35
were also protected. 1
Despite finding that certain of the statements alleged were factually
incorrect, and thus properly the subject of an action in defamation, the
ECHR awarded the journalist 4000 Euro in non-pecuniary damages for
the stress and frustration as36a result of the breach of the applicant's right
to freedom of expression. 1
Had the U.S. Supreme Court in Sullivan found that the minor
inaccuracies of the original New York Times advertisement were
employed in regard to a debate on an issue of public interest,
(segregation in the South) the expression itself might have been similarly
ruled protected and the "actual malice rule" consequently unnecessary.
One might wonder whether an even more explicit factual evaluation of
the original advertisement might not have led the Supreme Court to have
determined that it was insufficiently defamatory to have been actionable
in the first place!
C. Requirement of Free Legal Assistancefor Defamation Defendants to
Ensure Free Speech Rights of Anti-McDonald's Food Activists: Longest
Trial in British History
While Americans are familiar with court-provided legal assistance
for indigent criminal defendants in the criminal context, courts have

132.

Busuioc, 42 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 270-71, 84.
Id. at 269, $$ 73-74.
Id. at 259, 17.
135. Id. at269, 75.
136. Busuioc, 42 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 273, 104.
expenses of 1500 Euro. Id. at 274, 108.
133.
134.

The court also awarded costs and
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seldom expanded 3the
constitutional mandate of free legal assistance to
7
civil law actions. 1
In marked contrast, the ECHR read the protection of Article 10 to
include a requirement that the United Kingdom (U.K.) government
provide legal assistance for two defamation defendants, a part-time bar
38
worker and an unwaged single parent, in Steel v. United Kingdom.,
The case involved a Greenpeace campaign against McDonald's in the
mid-1980s. 3 9 The campaign employed a six-page leaflet entitled
"What's wrong with McDonald's?"' 140 The ECHR described the leaflet
as follows:
The first page of the leaflet showed a grotesque cartoon image of a man,
wearing a Stetson and with dollar signs in his eyes, hiding behind a "Ronald
McDonald" clown mask. Running along the top of pages 2 to 5 was a header
comprised of the McDonald's "golden arches" symbol, with the words
"McDollars, McGreedy, McCancer, McMurder, McDisease..." and so forth
superimposed on it. 141

The text drew connections between McDonald's, starvation in the
142
"Third World," and the destruction of rain forests to produce pet food.
Appellations such as "Murdering A Big Mac" and "What's Your
Poison" were accompanied by paragraphs describing the slaughtering of
fully conscious animals, and the poisoning of people with chicken and
minced meat contaminated with gut contents, feces, and urine, leading to
bacterial infections responsible for seventy percent of all food-poisoning
incidents. 143 McDonald's was accused of being anti-union, and
44
sweating and exploiting its cheap labor. 1
In 1990, McDonald's brought a libel suit against the two applicants
137. See Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982) (finding a right to legal assistance in
actions in which a state seeks to advance "permanent neglect proceedings"); Lassiter v. Dep't
of Soc. Servs. of Durham County, 452 U.S. 18 (1981) (finding a right to legal assistance in
actions in which the state seeks to permanently deprive a parent of parental rights); Vitek v.
Jones, 445 U.S. 480 (1980) (plurality opinion) (finding a right to legal assistance upon an
involuntary transfer of a prison inmate to a psychiatric unit); Project Release v. Prevost, 722
F.2d 960 (2d Cir. 1983) (finding a right to legal assistance upon involuntary commitment of
the mentally ill).
138. 2005-Il Eur. Ct. H.R. 1. Both defendants were, at least some of the time, unwaged
or unemployed, and dependent on government income support. Id. at 8, 9.
139. Id.at 8, 10.
140. Id.
141. Steel, 2005-11 Eur. Ct. H.R. at 8-9, 1 11 (omission in original).
142. Id at9,. 12.
143. Id at 12, 12.
144. Id.
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and three other persons. 145 The ensuing litigation entailed 313 court
days and "was the longest trial (either civil or criminal) in English legal
history."' 146 At the end of the trial, the trial judge "deliberated for six
months before delivering his substantive 762-page judgment on June 19,
1997." 147
The court made findings, including:
[I]t was and is untrue to say that either Plaintiff has been to blame for
starvation in the Third World. It was and is untrue to say that they have
bought vast tracts of land or any farming land in the Third World, or that they
have caused the eviction of small farmers or anyone else from their land.
It was and is untrue to say that either Plaintiff has been guilty of destruction
of rainforest thereby causing wanton damage to the environment.
It was and is untrue to say that either of the Plaintiffs have used lethal
poisons to destroy vast areas or any areas of Central American rainforest ....
It was and is untrue to say that either Plaintiff has lied when it has claimed
to have used recycled paper.
The charge that McDonald's food is very unhealthy because it is high in
fat, sugar, animal products and salt ... is untrue.
It was and is untrue that Plaintiffs sell meat products which, as they must
know, expose their customers to a serious risk of food poisoning.
It was and is untrue that the Plaintiffs have a policy of preventing
unionisation [sic] by getting rid of pro-union workers. 148

The court also found:
[V]arious of the . . . Plaintiffs' advertisements, promotions and booklets
have pretended to a positive nutritional benefit which McDonald's food, high
in fat and saturated fat and animal products and sodium, and at one time low in
fibre [sic], did not match.
It was true to say that the Plaintiffs exploit children by using them as more
susceptible subjects of advertising, to pressurise [sic] their parents into going
into McDonalds.
Although some of the particular allegations made about the rearing and
slaughter of animals are not true, it was true to say, overall, that the Plaintiffs
are culpably responsible for cruel practices in the rearing and slaughter of
some of the animals which are used to produce their food.
...It was true to say that the... [U.K .McDonald's] pays its workers low

145.
146.
147.
148.

Steel, 2005-lI Eur. Ct. H.R. at 13, 14.
Id. at 14-15, 19.
Id. at 16, 26.
Id. at 17-18 27 (internal quotations omitted).
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wages and thereby helps to depress wages for workers in the catering trade in
Britain, but it has not been proved that ...[U.S. McDonald's] pays its workers
low wages. 149

The court awarded U.S. McDonalds 30,000 British pounds and
U.K. McDonalds a further 30,000 pounds. 150 The award was later
reduced to a total of536,000 pounds for one of the defendants and 40,000
pounds for another. ' '
The Court of Appeals rejected the defendant's various contentions
in its 301-page judgment delivered on March 31, 1999.152 In particular,
the court found that commercial corporations, even strong corporations,
have a clear right to sue for defamation. 53 Just as with an individual
plaintiff, a corporation need not make a showing "that it had suffered
actual damage, since damage to a trading reputation might be as difficult
to prove as damage to the reputation of an individual .... 54 The court
also reaffirmed the English rule that a publication shown to be
defamatory was presumed to be false until proven otherwise and it was
the defendants' burden to prove the truth of statements presented as
assertions of fact. 55 The court determined that it was not "an abuse of
process in itself for plaintiffs with great resources to bring a complicated
case against unrepresented defendants of slender means.
Large
corporations are entitled to bring court proceedings to assert or defend
their legal rights
just as individuals have the right to bring actions and
56
defend them."
The Court of Appeals refused a leave to appeal to the House of
Lords 57 and an application was filed before the ECHR on September

149. Steel, 2005-11 Eur. Ct. H.R. at 17-18, $ 27 (fourth and fifth alteration in original)
(internal quotations omitted).
150. Id. at 18, 1 29. No costs were requested by McDonald's. Id.
151. Id.at22,135.
152. Steel, 2005-Il Eur. Ct. H.R. at 18-21, 1 30, 32.
153. Id. at 19,
32. There are certain exceptions to this rule in English law: local
authorities, government-owned corporations, and political parties cannot sue in defamation
because of the public policy that such entities should be open to uninhibited public criticism.
Id. at 22, 40.
154. Id. at 19, 132.
155. Steel, 2005-II Eur. Ct. H.R. at 20, 32.
156. Id. at 21, $ 33 (internal quotations omitted). The Court of Appeals did find that the
allegation "that, if one eats enough McDonald's food, one's diet may well become high in fat
etc., with the very real risk of heart disease, was justified." Id. at 22, 34 (internal quotations

omitted).
157.

Id. at 22, 135.
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20, 2000.158 The applicants raised several arguments before the ECHR,
in particular: the failure to provide legal aid to the defendants impeded
their ability to defend themselves 5 9 and the imposition of the burden of
proof upon the defendants was allegedly contrary to Article 10 and its
mandate that a democracy60 benefits from free and open discussion of
matters of public interest.'
The applicants pointed out that the adversarial system of justice in
the United Kingdom was based upon the idea that each side could
"adduce their evidence and test their opponent's evidence in
circumstances of reasonable equality."' 16' According to the applicants,
various conditions worked to undermine this idea in their case. For
example, they noted that McDonald's, in its position of economic power,
outstripped many small countries, whereas the applicants were a parttime bar worker earning sixty-five pounds per week and an unwaged
single parent.162 In addition, Queen's Counsel, junior Counsel, and a
team of solicitors and administrative staff from one of the largest firms
in England represented McDonald's, 163 while pro bono lawyers
represented the applicants on eight days during the twenty-eight days of
pre-trial hearings and the thirty-seven court days of appeals.164 During
the main trial, "submissions were made by lawyers on their behalf on
only three occasions."1 65 Furthermore, "offers of help usually came
from inexperienced, junior solicitors and barristers, without the time and
resources to be effective."' 166 They pointed out several particular
instances in which their own failures, such as securing, preparing, and
paying the expenses of witnesses, prevented67them from proving the truth
of various charges found to be unjustified. 1
The ECHR considered the submission on the necessity of legal
assistance in the context of an earlier holding "that the English law of
defamation and rules of civil procedure applicable in that case were not
sufficiently complex to necessitate the grant of legal aid."'' 68 As the

158.
159.

Steel, 2005-II Eur. Ct. H.R. at 7,
Id. at 26, 52.

160.

Id. at 33,

161.
162.
163.

Id. at 25, 50.
Steel, 2005-1I Eur. Ct. H.R. at 25-26, 50.
Id. at 26, T50. The junior Counsel was a specialist in libel law. Id.

164.

Id.

165.
166.
167.
168.

Steel, 2005-I Eur. Ct. H.R. at 26, 50.
Id.
Id. at 26, 52.
Id. at 29-30, 64 (citing McVicar v. United Kingdom, 2002-III Eur. Ct. H.R. 255).

1.

78-79.
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court pointed out, that case required only that the applicant prove the
truth of a single, principal allegation, and cross examine plaintiffs
69
witnesses in the course of a trial that lasted slightly over two weeks. 1170
The instant case was far more complex, both factually and legally.
For example, it involved 130 oral witnesses, including a number of
expert witnesses dealing with scientific questions, including issues that
the English court held were too complicated for a jury to properly
understand. 171 In addition, over 40,000 pages of documentary evidence
were involved. 172
The court weighed the "sporadic help" accorded the applicants by
volunteer lawyers and the extensive judicial assistance, but concluded
that neither "was any substitute for competent and sustained
representation by an experienced lawyer familiar with the law of
libel."'' 73 "[T]he disparity between the respective levels of legal
assistance enjoyed by the applicants and McDonald's ... was of such a
degree that it could not have failed, in this exceptionally demanding
case, to have given rise to unfairness.
,74
Hence, there was a failure
to provide a right to a fair trial as provided for in Article 6 of the
175
European Convention on Human Rights.
Sullivan and its progeny have never considered the necessity, vel
non, of free legal assistance in a defamation case. 176 Therefore, the
ECHR's decision in Steel certainly merits attention, particularly in
situations in which a defamation lawsuit is employed to harass public169.

Steel, 2005-11 Eur. Ct. H.R. at 29-30, 64.
170. Id.at 30, 65-66.
171. Id. at65, 65.
172. Id. at30, 65.
173. Steel, 2005-1I Eur. Ct. H.R. at 31, 69. The court also pointed out that "[t]he very
length of the proceedings [was] . . . a testament to the applicants' lack of skill and
experience." Id.
174. Id.
175. Id. at 32, 72. Article 6 provides in part:
In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge
against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable
time by and independent and impartial tribunal established by law.
Everyone charged with a criminal offence has the following minimum rights:
.I. (c) to defend himself in person or through legal assistance of his own choosing
or, if he has not sufficient means to pay for legal assistance, to be given it free when
the interests ofjustice so require.
COUNCIL OF EUROPE, supra note 31, at 5-6.
176.

See Lyrissa Barnett Lidsky, Silencing John Doe: Defamation & Discourse in

Cyberspace,49 DUKE L.J. 855 (2000).
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spirited defendants.
The ECHR then turned to the Article 10 issues. It asserted that
"[flreedom of expression constitutes one of the essential foundations of a
democratic society and one of the basic conditions for its progress and
for each individual's self-fulfilment [sic]." 17 7 With respect to value
judgments, the court balanced a number of factors to determine whether
178
the governmental interference with speech was proportional.
"'[P]olitical expression,' including expression on matters of public
interest and concern, requires a high level of protection under [Article]
1O. ' ' 179 While the government correctly "pointed out that the applicants
were not journalists, and [thus] should not... attract the high level of
protection afforded to the press," in a democratic society, the ECHR
considers that "even small and informal campaign groups... must be
able to carry on their activities effectively."' 180 Thus, there is a "strong
public interest in enabling such... individuals ... to contribute to the
public debate ... on matters of general public interest such as health and
the environment." 181
The court went on to state that there are limits to this right, even for
the press, in particular with respect to the reputation and rights of others.
The court "consider[ed] that in a campaigning leaflet a certain degree of
hyperbole and exaggeration is to be tolerated .... In the present case,
however, the allegations were of a very serious nature182and were
presented as statements of fact rather than value judgments."
The ECHR then considered and rejected argument that it was unfair
to place the burden of proving truth of defamatory statements upon the
speaker or publisher. 183 Nor did the ECHR consider it proper to deprive
a large, multinational corporation of the right to defend itself against
defamatory allegations. 184
Despite these findings, the ECHR held that the U.K. breached
Article 6(1) because it failed to strike "the correct balance . . . between
the need to protect the applicants' rights to freedom of expression and
the need to protect McDonald's rights and reputation."' 85 The court

177.

Steel, 2005-II Eur. Ct. H.R. at 35,

178.
179.

Id. at 36, 88.
Id
Id at 36, 89.
Steel, 2005-I Eur. Ct. H.R. at 36,
Id. at38, 90.
Id at37, 93.
Id at 87, 94.
Steel, 2005-11 Eur. Ct. H.R. at 38,

180.

181.
182.
183.
184.
185.

87 (internal quotations omitted).

89.

95.
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considered the "chilling effect" on others as an important factor in this
context, "bearing in mind the legitimate and important role that
campaign groups can play in stimulating public discussion."'1 6 The
ECHR went on to consider the size of the award against the two
applicants, and stated that while serious allegations had been made,
under English law, McDonald's had not been required to, and did not,
establish that it had in fact suffered any financial loss. 187 While
McDonald's had made no attempt to collect the judgment, the ECHR
considered the award of damages disproportionate and thus a violation
of Article 10.188
It is worth noting that in Sullivan, the court did comment that the
"judgment awarded in this case-without the need for any proof of
actual pecuniary loss-was one thousand times greater than the
maximum fine provided by the Alabama criminal statute, and one
hundred times greater than that provided by the Sedition Act."' 8 9 Would
it be worth adopting a proportionality test for damages when no actual
harm has been demonstrated? In Sullivan, not only had the police
commissioner recorded a $500,000 judgment in another suit, a litigant
had also recovered $500,000 for the same advertisement, and suits were
pending seeking $2,000,000 in additional awards. 90 Enormous verdicts
themselves, and even the threat of enormous verdicts, can operate as
serious chills to free expression.
The ECHR rejected any award of pecuniary damages, but did
award non-pecuniary damages of 20,000 Euros to one applicant and
15,000 Euros to the other. 19'
D. Criminal DefamationLaw: A Dangerous PoliticalWeapon Remains
Alive in Europe
With the assistance of the Supreme Court's decision in Ashton v.
Kentucky, 192 issued only two years after Sullivan, the criminal version of
186.
187.
188.

Id.
Id.at 38-39, 96.
Id at 39, 97-98.

189.

New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 277 (1964).

190.

Id.at 278 n.18.

191.

Steel, 2005-1I Eur. Ct. H.R. at 40-41,

106, 109. Costs of 50,000 Euros were also

awarded. Id.
at 42, 112.
192. 384 U.S. 195 (1966). The petitioner had been "sentenced to six months in prison
and fined $3,000 for printing a pamphlet" found in violation of Kentucky criminal libel law.
Id.at 196. "The trial court had charged that 'criminal libel is defined as any writing
calculated to create disturbances of the peace, corrupt the public morals, or lead to any act,
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libel law has largely passed into desuetude in the United States. In
Ashton, the Supreme Court held that Kentucky's common law criminal
libel law was so indefinite and so uncertain that it could not be enforced
as a penal offense consistently with the First Amendment of the U.S.
Constitution. 193
Since there is currently a movement to criminalize online
defamation in the United States, 194 it is worthwhile to review the
jurisprudence of the ECHR regarding criminal defamation cases---cases
still permitted in various European jurisdictions. 95
1. Private CriminalDefamationActions
In Cumpana v. Romania,196 a newspaper article alleged that city
authorities entered into an illegal contract with a private corporation
relating to the impounding of illegally parked vehicles. 197 The article
claimed that city council had previously authorized the city to enter a
contract with another contractor. 198 The article stated the former deputy
mayor "received backhanders from the partner company and bribed his
subordinates... or forced them to break the law." 199 The article further
alleged that "large numbers of privately owned vehicles ha[d] been
damaged and ...thousands of complaints ha[d] been made ....200
Later that year, the Financial Control Department of the County Audit
Court determined that the award of the contract "had not been justified
by any bid submitted" and that no income had been lost for the city
council, and urged compliance with the law regarding the obligations
under the contract. 201
Shortly after the newspaper published the article, a woman, who
which, when done, is indictable."' Id.at 198.
193. Id.("[S]ince no Kentucky case has redefined the crime in understandable terms, and
since the law must be made on a case to case basis, the elements of the crime are so indefinite
and uncertain that it should not be enforced as a penal offense in Kentucky.").
194. See Susan W. Brenner, Should Online Defamation be Criminalized?, 76 MISS. L.J.
705, 786 (2007). (arguing "for incorporating a narrowly-focused, precisely-defined
defamation offense into our criminal law").
195. See Dean Chapman, Note, SuppressingDissent: The Pivotal Role of the Prosecutor
in CriminalDefamation Proceedings in Countries Subject to the European Court of Human
Rights, 14 COLUM.J. EUR. L. 597 (2008).
196. 2004-XI Eur. Ct. H.R. 63.

197.
198.

Id.at 72,
Id.

20.

199.
200.

Id.(internal quotations omitted).

201.

Id.at73,

Cumpana,2004-XI Eur. Ct. H.R. at 72,

20.

23.
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previously served as the city council's legal expert and had since
become a judge,2 °2 filed criminal charges against the journalists for
insult and defamation.20 3 In particular, she complained of her depiction
in a cartoon as a "woman in a miniskirt, on the arm of a man with a bag
full of money, and with certain intimate parts of her body emphasized as
a sign of derision. 20 4 After the applicants failed to appear for a hearing,
the court adjudged them guilty of insult and defamation, and sentenced
them to ten months imprisonment-three months for insult and seven
months for defamation-with seven months of immediate
imprisonment. 20 5 The court also prohibited them from working as
journalists for one year after serving their prison terms and ordered them
to pay non-pecuniary damages of 2033 Euros.

20 6

In its justification of

the decision,
The court note[d] that the injured party is a public figure and that, following
the publication ... , her superiors and the authority above them asked her to
explain herself regarding the trial, particularly in view of the fact that she was
due to207take the professional examination to obtain permanent [judicial]
status.

On appeal, the decision was affirmed. 208 However, "the procurator
g5nral applied to the Supreme Court of Justice to have the
judgments... quashed," asserting that the cartoon only highlighted
allegations of corruption and "did not constitute the actus reus of insult
as defined in" the criminal code. 20 9 Additionally, the procurator g~n~ral
argued that the amount of the fine was "extremely high and had not been
objectively justified., 2 10 Lastly, it was asserted that the requirements for
prohibiting a person "who had committed unlawful acts from practicing
a particular profession on account of their incompetence, lack of training
or any other ground making them unfit to practise [sic] the profession,
were not satisfied" in the instant case for lack of unequivocal proof of
incompetence.2 11

202.
203.
204.

205.
206.
207.
208.
209.
210.
211.

Id. at71,
Id. at 74,

19.
25.
Cumpana, 2004-XI Eur. Ct. H.R. at 74, T 25 (internal quotations omitted).
Id. at 75-76, 37.
Id.at 76, 37.
Id. at 78, 40 (internal quotations omitted).
Cumpana, 2004-XI Eur. Ct. H.R. at 78, T43.
Id. at 78, 44.
Id.
Id. at79, 44.
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The Supreme Judicial Court rejected these submissions, finding that
the cartoon "was likely to have an adverse effect on the injured party's
honour, dignity and public image," that it "disparage[d] her honour and
reputation, [so as to] constitute[] the offense of insult," and that the fine
was justified because the "mass-circulation newspaper
... seriously
21 2
party.
injured
the
of
honour
and
dignity
offended the
The applicants failed in their submissions to the ECHR, which
found by a vote of five to two that there had been no violation of Article
10.213
The applicants then appealed to a Grand Chamber, which
accepted the request for a hearing. 214 The Grand Chamber focused its
opinion on the matter of whether the actions of the national courts were
necessary in a democratic society.2 15
In this context, the court considered the vital role of the press as
"public watchdog" in a democratic society and, in particular, that the
article in question mainly concerned the administration of public funds
by certain local representatives.216 The matter was indisputably one of
"general interest to the community which the applicants were entitled to
bring to the public's attention. 217
The article, however, conveyed the message that the original
plaintiff had been involved in fraudulent dealings and was couched in
virulent terms such as "scam," "series of offenses," "intentional breach"
of the law, and "bribes. 2 18 The court reiterated it position that "[t]he
existence of facts can be demonstrated, whereas the truth of value
judgments is not susceptible of proof., 21 9 However, "even a value
'22 °
judgment can be excessive if it has no factual basis to support it.
Therefore, even though the applicants' statements about the plaintiff
"were mainly worded in the form of an alternative," they could be

212. Cumpana, 2004-XI Eur. Ct. H.R. at 79, 71 45-46 (internal quotations omitted). The
applicants never served any of the prison time because the procurator-gnral executed a
series of suspensions and then they received a Presidential pardon dispensing the prison
sentence. Id.at 80,11 48-50. The Presidential pardon also waived the secondary penalty that

disqualified them from exercising their civil rights. Id.at 80, 7 50. The two applicants
continued for a time in their journalist positions, one was impacted by staff cutbacks for a
time, and the second eventually was elected mayor of Constanta. Id.
at 80-81,
51-54.
213. Cumpana, 2004-XI Eur. Ct. H.R. at 70, 1 8.
214. Id.at70, % 9-10.
215. Id at 89, 88.
216. Id.at 90, 11 93-94.
217. Cumpana, 2004-XI Eur. Ct. H.R. at 90,195.
218. Id.at91,T97.
219. Id.at91,T98.
220. Id.at 91, 99.
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construed as containing allegations of specific conduct (i.e., that she had
accepted bribes, and behaved in a dishonest and self-interested manner),
or in a way that might lead one to believe that the "fraud" she was
accused of was "established and uncontroversial facts. 221 The Grand
Chamber was convinced that the national courts had actively sought to
establish the "judicial truth," but the applicants' clear lack of interest in
the judicial proceedings, by not attending at either the first instance court
or the County Court, and failure to adduce evidence at any stage of the
proceedings to substantiate their allegations, counted against them.222 In
particular, they failed to submit to the national courts "a copy of the
Audit Court report... or even indicate during the criminal proceedings.
. that their assertions had been based on such an official report. ' 223 In
the end, the Grand Chamber also determined that the national court
224
determinations of violations met a "pressing social need.
This still left the issue of whether the penalties were proportionate
to the interference with free expression. The court found the penalties of
seven months imprisonment, prohibition "from exercising certain civil
rights and from working as journalist for one year" very severe.22 5
According to the court, while Contracting States may impose penalties,
they "must not do so in a manner that unduly deters the media from
fulfilling their role of alerting the public to apparent or suspected misuse
of public power., 226 The chilling effect of criminal penalties upon
journalistic freedom of expression is evident.22 7 A prison sentence for a
press offense would be compatible with freedom of expression only in
exceptional circumstances, notably when hate speech or incitement to
violence is involved.228 The case at bar presented "no justification
whatsoever for the imposition of a prison sentence.' 2 29 Itdoes not
matter that a presidential pardon meant that the applicants did not serve
any prison time; such a pardon does not expunge their conviction.23 °
Moreover, the imposition of an order disqualifying the applicants from
exercising all civil rights, again waived because of the presidential

221.
222.

Cumpana, 2004-XI Eur. Ct. H.R. at 91-92,
Id. at 92-93, 7 103-104.

223. Id at93,
224.
225.
226.

229.

105.

Id.at 94, 110.
Cumpana, 2004-XI Eur. Ct. H.R. at 94,
Id.at 94-95, 113.

227. Id.at 95,
228. Id.at 95,

100.

112.

114.
115.

Cumpana, 2004-XI Eur. Ct. H.R. at 95,

116.

230. Id.
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pardon, was particularly inappropriate in the instant case. 231
Additionally, the ban from working as journalists for one year was not
remitted, and even though it appears to have had no significant practical
consequences in the present case, was particularly severe and could not
have been justified by the mere risk of the applicants' re-offending.23 2
The prohibition of working as a preventive measure "contravened the
principle that the press must be able to perform the role of a public
watchdog in a democratic society. 23 3 Thus there had been a violation
of Article 10 of the Convention.23 4 The ECHR then went on to hold that
"the finding of a violation of Article 10 . . . [was] sufficient just
satisfaction for any non-pecuniary damage sustained by the
applicants. 2 35
The Cumpana case represents one of many criminal libel cases
from an eastern European country.23 6 It is not unique in a number of

231. Id. at 95-96, 9 117.
232. Id. at 96, 9118.
233. Cumpana, 2004-XI Eur. Ct. H.R. at 96, 1 119.
234. Id at 96, 122. The vote was sixteen to one, with one judge dissenting because of
the court's refusal to afford the applicants any just satisfaction. Id. at 102-03 (Costa, J.,
dissenting).
235. Id. at 98, T 130 (majority opinion). The court rejected a request for costs and
expenses since the applicants had neither quantified them nor submitted any supporting
documents. Cumpana, 2004-XI Eur. Ct. H.R. at 98, 134.
236. Not all such cases stem from Eastern Europe. A major counterexample is
Colombani v. France, 2002-V Eur. Ct. H.R. 25. That case dealt with two Le Monde articles
based on a confidential report commissioned by the European Commission naming Morocco
as the world's leading exporter and the main supplier of cannabis to Europe. Id. at 32-33, 9
10-13. The King of Morocco was greatly angered, and upon his complaint, the Paris public
prosecutor's office filed criminal charges for "insulting a foreign head of State." Id. at 33, TT
14-15. The first instance court acquitted the defendants on the grounds that the articles had
"merely quoted extracts from what was indisputably a reliable report." Id. at 33, 16. At the
King's urging, however, the government appealed and the Paris Court of Appeals found the
article "desire[d] to draw the public's attention to the involvement of the royal entourage" and
was thus "tainted with a malicious intent," and contained "accusations of duplicity, artifice
and hypocrisy that were insulting to a foreign head of State." Colombani, 2002-V Eur. Ct.
H.R. at 33-34, 9 17-18 (internal quotations omitted). A fine was assessed, including a direct
payment of 10,000 francs to the King of Morocco. Id. at 34, 19. The newspaper, Le
Monde, was also ordered to publish a report of the details of the convictions. Id.
Under French law, the defense of justification, which is normally available to a
charge of criminal defamation, is not available to a charge of insulting a foreign head of state.
Id. at 35, 9 26. The ECHR found that the French public had a legitimate interest in being
informed about the European Commissions' views on the problem of drug production and
trafficking in Morocco, a state with which France enjoys close relations. Colombani, 2002-V
Eur. Ct. H.R. at 43, 64. The information in the Commission's report was undisputed, and
information that the press should be able to rely upon without itself engaging in independent
research. Id. at 43-44, T 65. According to the ECHR, the elimination of a justification
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ways: 1) it concerned a relatively petty local dispute about political
corruption; 2) the case was not brought by a public prosecutor, but by an
individual; 3) prison time was ordered by the domestic courts along with
a financial penalty; 4) the individual bringing the criminal complaint was
closely connected with the local political elite; and 5) the ECHR found
that the penalty violated Article 10's protection of the freedom of
expression.
The threat of criminal prosecution for speech is quite serious, but
Cumpana is far from alone in illustrating that a private person may bring
such actions. Some, but not all, of such private criminal prosecutions for
defamation are brought by persons who might be described as
"politically connected." For example, Minelli v. Switzerland237 involved
a criminal defamation complaint by a company director against a
journalist, which was converted into a private prosecution.2 38 In Minelli,
the Canton of Zurich Assize Court ordered the defendant to pay two
thirds of the court costs with additional compensation based on its
determination that, if the case had gone to trial, the defendant would
have been found guilty. 239 In Helmers v. Sweden, 240 a university lecturer
who had not been appointed to an academic post brought a private
prosecution for libel.24 1
Kobenter v. Austria2 42 and Standard
Verlagsgesellschaft mbH v. Austria,24 3 however, involved private
prosecutions by government officials, with the former being brought by
a judge whose judgment in a case involving homosexuals had been
criticized,24 4 and the latter by an official whose exercise of voting rights
245
on behalf of a political region had been the subject of criticism.

defense, even in the case of a head of State, was beyond what was required to preserve a
person's reputation. Id.at 44, 1 66.
237. 62 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1983).
238. Id.at 7-8, 11 10-11. The case was eventually dismissed on procedural grounds. Id.
at8, 12.
239. Id. at 8-9, 11 12-13. The ECHR found that the requirements of a fair trial had been
violated. Minelli, 62 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 19, T 41.

240. 212-A Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) 1 (1991).
241. Id.at 8-9, 1 11, 14. The ECHR decided the case not on the basis of Article 10, but
on the basis that the requirements of a fair hearing under Article 6(1) had not been complied
with because the Court of Appeals denied a request for an oral public hearing. Id at 17,
38-39.
242. App. No. 60899/00 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Nov. 2, 2006), http://www.echr.coe.int.
243. App. No. 37464/02 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Feb. 22, 2007), http://www.echr.coe.int.
244. Kobenter, App. No. 60899/00, 1 12. The attacked judgment had been entered in a
private defamation prosecution against several defendants, one of which the judge convicted
of insult, and the other the judge acquitted. Id. 11.
245. Standard VerlagsgesellschaftmbH, App. No. 37464/02, 12. "[T]he article at issue
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Similarly, Kugmierek v. Poland246 involved an improperly delayed
private prosecution for libel brought by a Deputy Mayor.247 Likewise,
248 a former mayor and candidate for municipal
in Dlugolecki v. Poland,
249
council brought a private bill of indictment against a journalist.
Finally, in Karhuvaarav. Finland250 a Member of Parliament instituted
proceedings about newspaper coverage of her husband's assault upon a
police officer and received special protection because she was a Member
of Parliament.25
The ECHR reached the substance of the Article 10 claims in only a
few of these private actions, with Cumpana being the most extensive
opinion. In none of the decisions, however, did the ECHR find
imprisonment a proper penalty.
In most, it found the actions
inappropriate. Although, in one case, Standard Verlagsgesellschaft
mbH, by a narrow margin, four votes to three, the ECHR found no
violation of Article 10.252 In that case, the limited nature of the judicial
interference, forfeiture of the offending article, publication of the
judgment, and an order to revoke certain statements, were quite
significant to the ECHR majority. 253 For example, in Kobenter, the
ECHR found that the criticism of the judge was a matter of public
interest. 254 Indeed, the particular passages in the judge's opinion that
were the target of criticism were taken out of the final opinion by the
judge himself, and had resulted in an official warning to the judge in
subsequent disciplinary proceedings.255 The Austrian courts failed to
justify the criminal conviction for defamation or the imposition of a fine,
and the ECHR awarded the full amount of pecuniary damages claimed
256
as well as 5000 Euro for non-pecuniary damage for the journalist.
In Dlugolecki, the defendant, convicted of criminal insult, was
... fulfilled the elements of the offence of defamation ... under Article 111 of the Criminal
Code." Id. 19.
246. App. No. 10675/02 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Sept. 21, 2004), http://www.echr.coe.int.

247.

Id. 6-7.

248.

App. No. 23806/03 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Feb. 24, 2009), http://www.echr.coe.int.

249.

Id. 7-8.

250. 2004-X Eur. Ct. H.R. 259.
251. Id at 264, 11 8, 10. Defamation charges were rejected by the trial court, but fines
were assessed for invasion of privacy. Id.at 265, 12.

252. Standard Verlagsgesellschaf mbH v. Austria, App. No. 37464/02, 44 (Eur. Ct.
H.R. Feb. 22, 2007), http://www.echr.coe.int.
253. Id.
143.
254. Kobenter v. Austria, App. No. 60899/00,
31 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Nov. 2, 2006),
http://www.echr.coe.int.
255. Id.
256. Id.
1 33, 37-38.
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required to pay a small fine, make a charitable contribution, and publish
an apology, which resulted in a conditional discontinuance of the
proceedings for a probationary period of one year.257 The ECHR
determined that the publication during an election implicated the crucial
importance of free political debate and that the impugned statement was
a value judgment, which cannot be said to have been devoid of any
factual basis, and thus violated Article 10.258 The ECHR awarded nonpecuniary damages of 3000 Euro for distress and frustration resulting
from the litigation and conviction. 59 Most significantly, the ECHR also
stated:
[T]he criminal proceedings in the present case had their origin in a bill of
indictment lodged by the politician himself and not by a public
prosecutor ....Nevertheless ...when a statement.., is made in the context
of a public debate, the bringing of criminal proceedings against the 26
maker
of
0
the statement entails the risk that a prison sentence might be imposed.

The court went on to restate, as it had in Cumpana, that "a prison
sentence for a press offence will be compatible with the journalists'
freedom of expression ...

only in exceptional circumstances ...

'2 6
example, in the case of hate speech or incitement to violence."

as for

2. Public CriminalDefamation Actions
Unlike individual criminal prosecutions, defamation prosecutions
by public prosecutors offer the potential screening of such actions by an
impartial, objective public prosecutor. On the other hand, such public
prosecutions may also admit political pressure to protect favorite
politicians or public figures, or even to simply protect the government in
power from political dissidents.
For example, the Government of France intervened quite directly to
assure a criminal defamation prosecution to assuage the feathers of the
King of Morocco. 262 In a case from Spain, criminal proceedings were

257. Dlugolecki v. Poland, App. No. 23806/03, T 12 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Feb. 24, 2009),
http://www.echr.coe.int.
258. Id.
1 43-44, 48.
259. Id. 52. The fine, costs, and required contribution to a charity were quite small: the
fine, 50 Polish zlotyz (PLN) (approximately 13 Euros) to the charity; PLN 300 for the costs of
the proceedings; and PLN 118 to the State Treasury. Id.
1 2.
260. Dlugolecki, App. No. 23806/03, 47.

261.

Id.

262.

Colombani v. France, 2002-V Eur. Ct. H.R. 25, 33,

14.
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brought for insulting the Government.2 63 In a case from Poland, the
Deputy Speaker of the Senate and a Regional Prosecutor were targets of
articles by a candidate for Parliament. 264 The Deputy Speaker charged
that candidate with criminal libel.265 In Russia, upon the request of a
regional governor criticized in a regional paper, a criminal prosecution
was brought against the editor-in-chief.266
In the most serious of these cases, a senator in the Spanish
Parliament published a magazine article entitled "Insultante Impunidad"
("Outrageous Impunity") lamenting the number of murders in Basque
Country and the Government's failure to prosecute any perpetrator or to
enlist the public's help, such as through the media.267 The ECHR held
that Article 10 was violated by the denial of any ability to establish the
facts underlying the article.268 The Spanish courts had held that defenses
263. Castells v. Spain, 236 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 11, 8 (1992). The initial sentence
was for a term of imprisonment of one year and a day. Id. at 13,
13. As an accessory
penalty, the applicant "was also disqualified for the same period from holding any public
office and exercising a profession and [he was] ordered to pay costs." Id The Spanish
Supreme Court stayed enforcement of the prison sentence for two years but left intact the
accessory penalty, which the Constitutional Court later stayed. Id. at 14,
14. The
Constitutional Court later dismissed the appeal. Castells, 236 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 15,
17. Later "the Supreme Court ruled that the term of imprisonment had been definitively
served." Id. at 16, 18. The applicant was apparently out on bail but complained that "he had
to appear 52 times before the court of his place of residence ... and three times before the
Supreme Court of Madrid." Id. at 25,
55. The ECHR noted that, since he frequently
attended the courts in question as a lawyer, this constraint could hardly have caused him any
loss. Id.
264. Malisiewicz-Gasior v. Poland, App. No. 43797/98, 45 Eur. H.R. Rep. 563, 566-67,
8, 22-23 (2006).
265. Id. at 569, 28. The case was actually brought as a private indictment by the
Deputy Speaker of the Sejm, who had previously made a formal notification of an offense by
the defendant to Regional Prosecutor. Id. at 566, 8. The prosecutor had earlier signed a
warrant authorizing the search of the defendant's flat, signed an order allowing the tapping of
her telephone, and had subsequently been present with the Deputy Speaker when the
defendant's husband was arrested in connection with search of a cottage. Id. at 566,
9-10.
After conviction, the defendant was sentenced to an eighteen month term of imprisonment,
suspended for five years, ordered to publish an apology, and ordered to reimburse the costs of
the proceeding. Malisiewicz-Gasior,45 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 571,
33. Although she did not
publish an apology, the suspended sentence was not enforced against the defendant. Id at
573,
42-43.
266. Krasulya v. Russia, App. No. 12365/03, 45 Eur. H.R. Rep. 910, 915, 10 (2007). A
suspended sentence of one year's imprisonment was given, conditional on six months'
probation. Id. at 918, 21.
267. Castells v. Spain, 236 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 24, 48 (1992). "[A]t the conmon
law, truth or good motives was no defense [to a criminal libel action]." Beauharnais v.
Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 254 (1952). Therefore, the English law was not all that dissimilar to
that of Spain.
268. Castells, 236 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 24, 50.
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of "truth and good faith" were unavailable in respect to insults directed
at the institutions of the nation. 269 The ECHR stated it "attache[d]
decisive importance to the fact that [the Spanish Supreme Court]
declared such evidence inadmissible" even though it "is impossible to
state what the outcome... would have been" had such evidence been
admitted.2 70
271
In Malisiewicz-Gasior v. Poland,
the ECHR found that
statements made by the defendant during a political campaign were part
of a political debate, and the fact that she was running for office did not
mean, as the domestic courts had held, that she "had been trying to
achieve her private objective," but she was rather engaged in activity
"inherent in the concept of truly democratic regime. ' 272 Moreover, the
fact that the target of the attacks was a politician should have been taken
into account by the domestic courts demonstrating a greater degree of
tolerance.273 Finally, the court noted that the chilling effect of the
"severity of the penalty imposed" must be taken into consideration when
assessing the proportionality of the interference by the state with
freedom of expression.274
In analyzing criminal libel cases, the ECHR has stated that it will
take into account: "the position of the applicant, the position of the
person against whom the criticism was directed, the subject matter of the
publication, characterization of the contested statement by the domestic
courts, the wording used by the applicant, and the penalty imposed on
him. '' 275 In that connection, whether a value judgment or a factual
statement is at issue is a central concern of the ECHR, even though a
value judgment must also have adequate support to constitute a fair
comment.2 76 Strong wording may be permissible if "it did not resort to
offensive or intemperate language and did not go beyond the generally
accepted degree of exaggeration or provocation . . . covered by
journalistic freedom., 277 A journalist's role implicated "imparting

269.
270.

Id. at 24, 47.
Id. at 24, T 48.

271.

App. No. 43797/98,45 Eur. H.R. Rep. 563 (2006).

272.
273.
274.

Id.
at 578-79, 65-67.
Id.at 579, 67.
Id.
at 579, 68.

275. Krasulya v. Russia, App. No. 12365/03, 45 Eur. H.R. Rep. 910, 920, 35 (2007).
276. Id. at 921-22,
39, 41; see Schwabe v. Austria, 242-B Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) 23
(1992) (finding that a conviction violated Article 10 when impugned statement about alcohol

consumption was judged a value-judgment, for which no proof of truth is possible).
277.

Krasulya, 45 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 922,

43.
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information and ideas on matters of public concern, even those that may
offend, shock or disturb. 27 8 Even a suspended sentence conditioned
upon the commission of no further offenses implicated a condition
which, itself, was incompatible with Article 10 as "disproportionate to
279
the aim pursued and not 'necessary in a democratic society.'
On the other hand, in Barfod v. Denmark,2 80 a journalist was
convicted and fined for publishing an article that allegedly defamed two
lay judges who were also government employees. 28' The journalist had
stated that the two judges "did their duty" finding in favor of the
government, their employer.282 The ECHR determined that there had
been a personal attack on the two lay judges and that the criminal
conviction did not limit the right to criticize the composition of the High
Court in the tax case.283 Few Americans would have found anything
defamatory in the full context of the article, which primarily raised
conflict-of-interest problems.
Similarly, almost a decade later in Perna v. Italy,28 4 a Grand
Chamber of the ECHR sustained a fine, damage award, and costs award
against a journalist and the manager of an Italian daily newspaper for
defaming a prosecutor. 285 The trial court imposed fines of 1,000,000
Lire and 1,500,000 Lire, as well as the payment of damages and costs,
totaling 60,000,000 Lire, and required publication of the judgment in the
newspaper. 286 The offending article complained that a prosecutor was
biased towards the Italian Communist Party, (the PCI, later the PDS-the
Democratic Party of the Left) and that he had participated in an attempt
by the PCI to gain control of public prosecutor's offices and to destroy

278.

Id. at 922, 45.

279. Id. at 922,
44-45. The ECHR awarded 4000 Euros in non-pecuniary damages.
Id. at 924, T 57.
280.
149 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1989).
281. Id. at 8, 10. A fine of 2000 Danish Crowns was assessed. Id. at 495, 111.

282.

Id at 294, 9.

283.
284.

Barfod, 149 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 13-14,
(Pernafl), 2003-V Eur. Ct. H.R. 333.

33.

285. See id
286. Id. at 344, 16. These amounts, in dollars, were roughly $650, $970, and $39,000
(at 1,550 lire/dollar). In 1996 (the year these amounts were assessed) the lire's value in
dollars ranged between 1,584 lire to a dollar and 1,513 lire to a dollar. Federal Reserve Bank
of St. Louis, Italy/U.S. Foreign Exchange Rate (DISCONTINUED SERIES) (Mar. 3, 2006),
http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/data/EXITUS.txt. The Chamber opinion mentioned that
the newspaper paid all of these monetary amounts, so the journalist paid nothing personally.
Perna v. Italy (Perna 1), App. No. 48898/99,
50 (Eur. Ct. H.R. July 25, 2001),
http://www.echr.coe.int.
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people's reputation by the opening of a judicial investigation. 287 An
ordinary seven-judge chamber of the ECHR ruled that the first
allegation, exemplified by an assertion that the prosecutor had taken an
"oath of obedience," had a symbolic meaning and could not be
considered an excessively critical comment, and sanctioning such
statements violated Article 10.288 In addition, the Chamber determined
that the allegation of an alleged strategy (attributed to the PCI in the
article) of gaining control of the public prosecutors' offices in a number
of cities, was unsupported by an adequate factual basis, and thus
permissibly sanctioned.2 89
The Grand Chamber of seventeen judges, however, found no
violation of Article 10 (with a single dissent). 290 Nor did it bifurcate the
allegedly defamatory statements into two categories, as the previous
reviewing courts had seemed to do.291 Instead, it aggregated the
allegations' of a lack of objectivity and lack of independence into the
accusation of "carrying out his profession improperly and act[ing]
illegally, particularly in connection with the prosecution of Mr.
Andreotti. ' ' 292 Moreover, it noted several aggravating circumstances: 1)

287. PernaII, 2003-V Eur. Ct. H.R. at 341-44, 1 13. Investigation of a three-time prime
minister of Italy, Guilio Andreotti, for alleged mafia connections involving the use of a
government paid informer who the prosecutor allegedly met in the United States to offer
eleven million Lire a month for continued cooperation, formed part of the article. Id. Notable
quotes attributed to Andreotti include, "Power wears out those who don't have it." Richard
Owen, Andreotti: Why I Walked Out of My Own Biopic, TIMES (London), Mar. 17, 2009 at
15. In the movie Godfather III, a killer whispered the same phrase into the ear of a fictional
politician modeled on Andreotti, moments before killing him. Id.
288. PernaI, App. No. 48898/99,
47-48.

289.

Id.

290.

PernaIf, 2003-V Eur. Ct. H.R. at 358-59,

47-48.

291. Id.at 358, 47.
292. Id. at 356-57, 40. One could speculate that the appearance as a third-party
intervener, the complaining prosecutor (represented by a lawyer) in the first instance in the
Grand Chamber proceedings may have had an impact on the court's treatment of the evidence.
Neither the regular Chamber nor the Grand Chamber had any difficulty with the refusal of the
trial court to allow the prosecutor to be summoned and submitted to cross examination-in the
regular Chamber, because he had already denied the allegations, PernaI, App. No. 48898/99,
29, and in the Grand Chamber because, the journalist had not demonstrated that evidence
from the complaining prosecutor would have been helpful in proving some of the prosecutor's
alleged conduct. Perna II, 2003-V Eur. Ct. H.R. at 353, ! 32.
It is odd that the prosecutor should be given the unusual ability to intervene at the
Grand Chamber level for the first time when one of the major objections to the procedures
below was that that prosecutor was not subjected to cross examination about his conduct. The
court never explained, for example, why an answer to questions about the alleged trip of the
prosecutor to the United States to offer money to an informant could not have been probative
of issues before the court.
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"the fact of having imputed to the injured party [the complaining
prosecutor] the acts mentioned (and even criminal acts as regards the
informer.. .)" and 2) the fact of committing the defamation "to the
detriment of a civil servant in the performance of his official duties. 29 3
The latter aggravating circumstance, ironically, would be mitigating
under American jurisprudence. The opaque meaning of the first
aggravating circumstance may be clarified by the Grand Chamber's
rejection of the idea that taking the "oath of obedience" was symbolic, as
the regular Chamber found, but rather, in the whole context an
implication, that the prosecutor was furthering the overall strategy of the
PCI through the prosecution of Mr. Andreotti. 294 It is likely in the
United States that an allegation that the Justice Department was seeking
to implement the priorities of a president and his party through criminal
prosecution would be considered anything but opinion and/or not
defamatory in the first instance. Indeed, the issue of bias in the
prosecution and judiciary is a major issue in the political debate of
Italy.2 95
In a dissenting opinion, Judge Conforti decries the overall approach
of the Grand Chamber and Chamber opinions in separating procedural
issues from issues of substance for Article 10 purposes.2 9 6 The Court's
refusal to accept any evidence was extremely serious, particularly with
respect to evidence from the complaining prosecutor. 297 He notes that
the "Italian courts acted very speedily in determining the charges against
the applicant in less than four years at three levels of jurisdiction," this

In the Grand Chamber presentation, the attorney for the complaining prosecutor
denied that the domestic courts had recognized the political militancy to which the regular
chamber had referred in its judgment. Id. 1 38.
Andreotti, by the way, was not destroyed by the investigation. He continued as a

life senator and became a candidate for the presidency of the Senate at age 87, but was
narrowly defeated. John Hooper, ProdiStands Down After SurpriseDefeat in Senate over US

Alliance, GUARDIAN (London), Feb. 22, 2007, at 16. His critical abstention vote on January
21, 2007, however, caused the government of Prime Minister Romano Prodi to lose the vote
and Prodi to resign. Id.
293. Perna11, 2003-V Eur. Ct. H.R. at 357, 40 (internal quotations omitted).
294. Id.at 358, 47.
295.

See Richard Owen, Silvio Berlusconi Blasts 'Cancerous Growth' of Italian

Judiciary,
TIMES
(London),
June
26,
2008,
http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/europe/article421506 l.ece.
"Mr. Berlusconi
called the Italian judiciary a 'cancerous growth,' claiming biased prosecutors had pursued him
since he entered politics 14 years ago. Crossing his wrists as if in handcuffs, Mr. Berlusconi
said: 'Many prosecutors would like to see me like this."' Id.
296. PernaII, 2003-V Eur. Ct. H.R. at 360 (Conforti, J., dissenting).
297. Id
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"in a country condemned many times for the length of its
proceedings. 2 9s Most importantly, Judge Conforti notes that "it is
striking how many actions are brought by judicial officers against
journalists in Italy and how large are the sums awarded by the Italian
courts in damages. 299
3. Conclusion on the European Law of CriminalDefamation
While the ECHR has not rejected criminal defamation prosecutions
out of hand, in practice, it has done so except for cases in which
damages alone are awarded. In most such cases, either prosecutors or
the judiciary were the targets of the defamatory or insulting statements.
None of the recently considered cases involve the actual serving of
prison time, yet when prison time is ordered, the ECHR, time and time
again, has found that the conviction itself, and/or conditions on
remission of the prison sentence, were both incompatible with Article 10
and insufficiently protective of press and speech interests. The ECHR
repeatedly references the chilling of speech in such cases.
It is reasonable to assert that the United States is more protective of
speech in such actions, particularly actions in which prosecutors or
judges are complaining parties. Such greater protection of speech better
fosters open debate about the functioning of the justice system in
democratic systems. European law has heard Thomas Paine's message
in this particular compartment of European law.
On the other hand, while criminal actions to protect judges against
critical speech are virtually non-existent in the United States, sanctions
such as fines and disciplinary actions against attorneys are not. For
example, a Florida court fined a lawyer for describing a judge as an
"evil, unfair witch" with an "ugly, condescending attitude" on a
courthouse blog.3 °° In another case, a court imposed sanctions against
an attorney who called state appeals judges "jackasses" in a radio show
and compared them to Nazis for overturning a $15 million verdict he had
1
30

won.

298.
299.

Id.
Id. Judge Conforti closes his opinion lamenting that he had to express his opinion

in a case involving a prosecutor "risking his life in the fight against the Mafia." Perna II,
2003-V Eur. Ct. H.R. at 361 (Conforti, J., dissenting).
300. Tresa Baldas, Lawyers Criticalof Judges Fightfor Rights, NAT'L LAW J., Feb. 9,
2009, at 4 ( 1,200 fine plus reprimand).
301. Id. The attorney had represented Dr. Jack Kevorkian, a Doctor who assisted in
suicides. Id. The attorney is now contesting the Michigan Rule of Professional Conduct
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E. Injunctive Relieffor Defamation in the ECHR
In American law, the presumptive unconstitutionality of any prior
restraint upon publication means injunctive relief is rarely available.3 °2
That is not the case in Europe despite the ECHR. For example, in Wabl
v. Austria,30 3 a protestor described a newspaper article as "Nazi
journalism., 30 4 The newspaper secured an injunction from the Supreme
Court to prevent repetition of the allegation after two lower courts had
rejected the request. 3°5 The ECHR considered the remark "particularly
offensive," and held that the injunction was "'necessary in a democratic
30 6
society' for the protection of the reputation and rights of others."
In Plon v. France,30 7 the widow and children of President
Mitterrand requested an injunction to prevent the continued distribution
of a book, Le Grand Secret, which allegedly invaded President
Mitterrand's privacy and injured his relatives' feelings by disclosure of
confidential medical information. 30 8 The book discussed the relations
between Dr. Gubler and President Mitterrand after the President had
been diagnosed with cancer in 1981 (a matter that was treated, at the
time, as a State secret). 30 9 The requested interim injunction was issued
by a lower court and upheld by the Paris Court of Appeal. 310 That
issuance occurred twenty-four hours after the book was published, by
which time 40,000 copies had been sold, and ten days after President
Mitterrand had died. 311 By the time the judgment on the case-in-chief
was issued by the tribunalde grande instance, Mitterrand had been dead

requiring treatment of judges with "courtesy and respect" and barring "discourteous or
undignified conduct." Id.
302. See Neb. Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539 (1976); New York Times Co. v.
United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971); Near v. Minnesota ex rel. Olson, Co., 283 U.S. 697

(1931).
303.
304.
305.

App. No. 24773/94,31 Eur. H.R. Rep. 1134 (2001).
Id. at 1138,7T 14.
Id. at 1139,
18-20.

306.

Id. at 1142-44,

307.
308.

App. No. 58148/00,42 Eur. H.R. Rep. 705 (2006).
Id. at 708-09, $T 9.

41, 61.

309. Id. at 708-09, 7 6, 8.
310. Id at 710-12, 1 9-10. Appeals to the Court of Cassation were dismissed. Plon, 42
Eur. H.R. Rep. at 712,
11. Criminal proceedings against Dr. Gubler, a journalist who
assisted him, and the managing director of the publisher resulted in a four-month prison
sentence for Dr. Gubler and fines for the Plon officers. Id at 712, 12. The civil proceedings
not only produced an injunction, but also a damage award for the widow and children. Id. at
712-13,

311.

14.

Id.at 732, T 53.
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for nine and a half months.3 12
While the ECHR applied a balancing test to determine that the
interim injunction was proportionate and justified by the context of grief
for the widow and children,313 by the time of the final trial
determination, nine and a half months later, continuation of the
injunction was disproportionate to the interests sought to be protected
and thus no longer justified.31 4 By that time, not only had the book sold
40,000 copies, "but it had also been disseminated on the internet and...
been the subject of considerable media comment., 315
In this
determination, the ECHR considered the book's depiction of the
President as having consciously lied to the French people about the
existence and duration of his illness in the context of "a wide-ranging
debate in France on a matter of public interest, in particular the public's
right to be informed about any serious illnesses suffered by the Head of
State, and the question whether a person who knew that he was seriously
ill was fit to hold the highest national office. 316
Governments in Europe do seek to enjoin the publication of
material considered inappropriate by the government. For example, in
Sunday Times v. United Kingdom, 317 (hereinafter Sunday Times 1) the
British government sought, and was granted, an injunction to prevent the
publication of an article on the background of the introduction of the
drug thalidomide to the British market. 318 Similarly, in Sunday Times v.
United Kingdom (No. 2), 3 19 (hereinafter Sunday Times I) the British
government was granted an injunction to prevent the publication of a
book called "Spycatcher" and any related material about the British
Secret Service (M15). 32 ° In both cases the Grand Chambers of the
312.
313.

Plon, 42 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 732,
Id. at730-31, 47.

314.
315.

Id.at 732-33, 51, 53-54.
Id.at733, 53.

53.

316. Plon, 42 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 729, 44.
317. (Sunday Times 1), 30 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1978). In a second decision the ECHR
awarded costs for the ECHR litigation in the amount of 22,626.78 Pounds (by a vote of 13-3).
Sunday Times v. United Kingdom, App. No. 6538/74, 3 Eur. H.R. Rep. 317, 331, 51 (1981).
318. See Sunday Times 1, 30 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A). Thalidomide was prescribed for a

time as a sedative for expectant mothers. Id. at 8, 8. In the U.K. in 1961, a number of these
women gave birth to children with severe deformities; in the end, some 450 such births
occurred. Id.
319. (Sunday Times 11), 217 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1991).
320. Id. at 10, C 9. The first actions seeking to enjoin publication of Spycatcher began in
September, 1985 with respect to publication in Australia. Id. at 11, 13. Eventually, the
book was published in the United States on July 14, 1987, and many copies were brought back
into the U.K. by travelers or were obtained through mail delivery from American bookshops
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ECHR found violations of Article 10; in Sunday Times 1,by an eleven322
321
vote to nine-vote margin, and in Sunday Times H unanimously.
In Sunday Times I, the Government sought the injunction to delay
publication of a particular article because of its fear that the article
prejudged the issue of negligence related to ongoing civil actions against
a drug manufacturing company defendant, Distillers Company
(Biochemicals) Limited ("Distillers"),32 3 and to avoid the risk of "trial
by newspaper., 324 The opinion for the ECHR, however, agreed with the
applicants that the case had "been in a 'legal cocoon' for several years,
and that it was... far from certain that the parents' actions would have
come on for trial. 325 The ECHR further found that it was difficult to
divide the wider issues (which the Government did not seek to preclude
from press discussion) from the negligence issue; for the question of
where responsibility lies for the tragic situation was a matter of public
concern. 326 The ECHR recognized that "courts cannot operate in a
vacuum." 327 While courts are a "forum for the settlement of disputes,
this does not mean that there can be no prior discussion of disputes
elsewhere, be it in specialised [sic] journals, in the general press or
amongst the public at large. 32 8
In Sunday Times I, the injunctions obtained by the Government
related to articles about a book, Spycatcher, written by Mr. Peter Wright,
a former senior member of M15. 329 The legal action was based upon an
argument that Mr. Wright breached his duty of confidentiality under his
employment contract. 330
The book asserted that "M15 conducted
unlawful activities calculated to undermine the 1974-1979 Labour
Government, burgled and 'bugged' the embassies of allied and hostile
countries and planned and participated in other unlawful and covert
activities at home and abroad," and that a person who headed M15 for a
time when Wright was employed there was a Soviet agent.331 The first

willing to deliver in the United Kingdom. Id. at 17,
28-29.
321. Sunday Times 1,30 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 45.
322. Sunday Times 11, 217 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 31, 56.
323. Sunday Times 1, 30 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 9, 11.
324. Id.at 18, 25.

325.
326.

Id.at41, 66.
Id.at41-42, 66.

327.

Sunday Times 1, 30 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 40,

328.
329.
330.
331.

Id.
Sunday Times l,217 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 11(1991).
Id.at 12, 13.
Id.at 11, 11.

65.
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action was commenced in Australia to enjoin publication.332 After
related articles were published in the United Kingdom by the Observer
and Guardian newspapers, the U.K. Government brought suit in the
Chancery Division of the High Court of Justice of England and Wales
against both newspapers, their editors, and their journalists.333 In these
actions, the Government sought permanent injunctions on the theory that
the information in Spycatcher was confidential, that it had come into the
newspapers' hands through a breach of confidence, and that knowing
reception of such material meant that the same duty of confidentiality
applied to the newspapers and their employees as owed by Mr.
Wright.334 Ex parte interim injunctions were granted on June 27, 1986,
and continued in effect by an inter partes hearing on July 11, 1986.335
On appeal in the British court system, both the Court of Appeal and the
Appellate Committee of the House of Lords considered the grant of the
interim injunctions justified.336 Although the trial court had ordered the
3 37
injunctions discharged in view of the publication in the United States,
the Appellate Committee of the House of the Lords continued the
injunctions on July 30, 1987.338 Spycatcher had been published in the
United States on July 14, 1987.339
The Sunday Times then brought the Appellate Committee's
decision before the ECHR.3 40 The ECHR found that, by the date of the
decision, the argument originally made regarding the necessity of
keeping information secret had morphed into an argument that the major
purpose of the injunctions was to promote the efficiency and reputation
of the Security Service. 34' According to the court, this would be
accomplished by preserving third party confidence in the Service,
"making clear that unauthorised [sic] publication of memoirs... would

332.
333.

Id.at 11-12, 13.
Sunday Times 11, 217 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 12-13,

334.

Id. at 13,

14-15.

15.

335. Id.at 13, 17.
336. Id.at 14, 18.
337. Sunday Times 11, 217 Eur. Ct. H.R.(ser. A) at 19, 33.
338. Id.at 20, 35.
339. Id. at 17, 28. Around 715,000 copies were printed in the United States, and most
sold by October 1987. Id. at 23, 38. Similarly, the book was printed in Canada (100,000
copies), in Australia (145,000 copies, half sold within a month) and Ireland (30,000 copies).
Sunday Times II, 217 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser A) at 23, 38.
340. Id.at 8, 1. The ECHR's opinion refers to the Times Newspapers Ltd, publisher of
the Sunday Times, and its editor, Mr. Andrew Neil Id.

341.

Id.at31,

55.
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not be countenanced," and deterring others from similar actions.3 42 The
court doubted that actions against the Sunday Times would have
achieved these objectives any further than had already been achieved by
actions against Mr. Wright himself. 343 Actions for profits existed
against Mr. Wright. 3 44
"[C]ontinuation of the restrictions [on
publication] after July 1987 prevented newspapers from exercising their
right and duty to purvey information, already available, on a matter of
legitimate public concern." 345
The ECHR concluded that the
interference was unnecessary in a democratic society and violated
Article 10.346 The ECHR went on to award costs in the amount of
100,000 pounds.347
The Sunday Times II case has an American counterpart in the
actions by the United States Government against Victor Marchetti and
John D. Marks to prevent publication of a book, The CIA and the Cult of
Intelligence.348 Unlike the action in Sunday Times II, however, the
action was commenced by the government, not against newspapers, but
against a former employee of the CIA to obtain an injunction based upon
a secrecy agreement executed by the employee. 349 The theory adopted
by the Fourth Circuit was that, by executing the
secrecy agreement, the
350
rights.
Amendment
First
his
waived
employee
Another line of cases in American jurisprudence deal with a similar
prior restraint, albeit prior restraint imposed by Congress, not by the
judiciary. These cases deal with the constitutionality of prior restraints
related to an administrative subpoena known as a National Security
Letter (NSL) to electronic communication service providers. 351 The

342.
343.
344.
345.
346.
347.

Sunday Times I, 217 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser A.) at 31, 55.
Id
Id.
Id.
Sunday Times H, 217 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 31, 56.
Id. at 34, 70.

348. VICTOR MARCHETTI & JOHN D. MARKS, THE CIA AND THE CULT OF
INTELLIGENCE (1974). The flyleaf to the book begins: "This book, the first in American
history to be subjected to prior government censorship ... " It was published with blank
spaces indicating the exact location and length of 168 deletions that the district court upheld,
and bold type indicating 140 sections that the government first sought to prevent publication
of, but which the district court permitted to be published. See Publisher's Note, id at ix.
349. See United States v. Marchetti, 466 F.2d 1309, 1311 (4th Cir. 1972). After the

Government censored the draft book, a subsequent action, filed by the publisher and authors,
ultimately upheld the injunctive bar to publishing the 168 deletions. Alfred A. Knopf, Inc. v.
Colby, 509 F.2d 1362 (4th Cir. 1975).
350. Colby, 509 F.2d at 1370.
351. Doe v. Gonzales, 500 F. Supp. 2d 379 (S.D.N.Y. 2007), rev'd,Doe v. Mukasey, 549
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statute prohibited the recipient of an NSL from disclosing the fact that an
NSL had been received, and structured judicial review of the nondisclosure requirement.35 2
The Federal Bureau of Investigation issued an NSL to John Doe,
Inc., an internet service provider.35 3 The Court found:
The letter directed John Doe, Inc. "to provide the [FBI] the names, addresses,
lengths of service and electronic communication transactional records, to
include [other information] (not to include message content and/or subject
fields) for [a specific] email address." The letter certified that the information
sought was relevant to an investigation against international terrorism or
clandestine intelligence activities and advised John Doe, Inc., that the law
"prohibit[ed] any officer, employee or agent" of the company from "disclosing
to any person that the FBI has sought or
35 4 obtained access to information or
records" pursuant to the NSL provisions.

After two different district courts held parts of the NSL statute
unconstitutional, 355 Congress amended the NSL statutes in two respects:
first, nondisclosure was changed to require certification by senior FBI
officials that "otherwise there may result a danger to the national
security of the United States, interference with a criminal,
counterterrorism, or counterintelligence investigation, interference with
diplomatic relations, or danger to the life or physical safety of any
person"; and second, provisions for judicial review were added
permitting a recipient of an NSL letter to petition
a U.S. district court for
35 6
an order modifying or setting aside the NSL.

F.3d 861 (2d Cir. 2008); Doe v. Gonzales, 386 F. Supp. 2d 66 (D. Conn. 2005); Doe v.
Ashcroft, 334 F. Supp. 2d 471 (S.D.N.Y. 2004), vacated, Doe v. Gonzales, 449 F.3d 415 (2d
Cir. 2006); see also 18 U.S.C. §§ 2709, 3511 (2006); Mukasey, 549 F.3d at 864, n.1 (listing
authority to issue NSLs in other contexts).
352.
18 U.S.C. §§ 2709(c), 351 1(b) (2006). Section 2709 had been originally enacted in
1986 as part of the Electronic Communication Privacy Act of 1986, but was amended several
times, including in 2001, by the USA Patriot Act. Mukasey, 549 F.3d, at 865.
353. Mukasey, 549 F.3d, at 865.
354. Id.(alterations in original).
355. See Gonzales, 386 F. Supp. 2d 66 (declaring statute's gag order provision
unconstitutional as applied to ISP); Ashcrofi, 334 F. Supp. 2d 471 (declaring the statute
unconstitutional as applied to ISP and statute's gag order provision unconstitutional on its
face).
356. USA Patriot Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-177,
§§ 115, 116(a), 120 Stat. 192, 214 (2006), amended by, USA Patriot Act Additional
Reauthorizing Amendments Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-178 § 4(b), 120 Stat. 278, 280
(2006); see also Mukasey, 549 F.3d at 866-67.
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1. Statutory Reworking
In Doe v. Mukasey,357 the Government urged the United States
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit to interpret each of the
standards for issuing NSL letters to require certification by senior FBI
officials that disclosure may result in an enumerated harm that is
relevant to "an authorized investigation to protect against international
terrorism or clandestine intelligence activities. 358 Such a narrow
construction avoids part of the troublesome reach of the statutory
language, which could authorize NSL letters for ordinary tortious
conduct based on the risk of "danger to the life or physical safety of any
person., 359 Such a narrowing construction action is beyond the scope of
any ECHR jurisprudence, indeed, beyond the jurisprudence of most
European courts, particularly in civil law jurisdictions, for European
courts seldom engage in substantial revisions of statutory language
through judicial reworking of the text.36°
The second issue in Mukasey concerned the scope of judicial
review. The court required that good reason exist for the NSL issuance,
as the Government argued before the court. 36 1 Good reason means more
than not frivolous, but rather some reasonable likelihood of an
enumerated harm. 362 Further, the Government took the position that the
burden was on it to demonstrate that such good reason exists, an issue on
which the statute itself was silent. 363

357. 549 F.3d 861 (2d Cir. 2008).
358. Id at 875 (internal quotations omitted).
359. Id.at 874-75. The court stated, "[a] secrecy requirement of such broad scope would
present highly problematic First Amendment issues." Id.
360. A counter-example may be that courts in the United Kingdom are instructed, by the
Human Rights Act of 1998, the statute incorporating the European Convention on Human
Rights into domestic United Kingdom law, that, if possible, a court is to construe a U.K.
statute to be consistent with the Convention. Human Rights Act, 1998, c. 42, § 3 (U.K.),
available at http://www.opsi.gov.uk/ACTS/acts1998/ukpga-19980042_en_1.
When
determining a question which has arisen in connection with a Convention right, the court is

directed to take into account judgments such as those of the ECHR so far as possible to do so
for both primary legislation and subordinate legislation. Id.at § 2(1). If, however, the U.K.
court determines that a U.K. statute is incompatible with Convention obligations, the court
must declare that incompatibility, but must not permit that determination to affect the validity
of the provision about which it is given and that declaration is not binding on the parties to the
proceedings. Id.at § 4(2-6). In other words, the U.K. statutory provisions must still be given
full effect by the U.K. court, but Parliament is put on notice that a problem exists.
361. Mukasey, 549 F.3d at 875.
362. Id.
363. Id The court stated that it accepted the Government's position on all three matters
of statutory construction and in doing so did not "trench[] on Congress's prerogative to
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2. ConstitutionalAnalysis
The Second Circuit in Mukasey applied the test established in
Freedman v. Maryland,364 a motion picture licensing case, which held,
inter alia, that the government bore the burden of initiating judicial
review. 365 In Mukasey, the Court determined that the government has
several options to avoid the Freedman burden. 366 For instance, the
Government could notify each NSL recipient that the recipient has a
short time, such as ten days, to give the Government notice that the
recipient wishes to contest the nondisclosure requirement.36 7 If the
Government receives such a notice, the Government could be given a
reasonable period in which to begin judicial proceedings, perhaps thirty
days, and the judicial proceedings would have to be concluded within a
prescribed time, perhaps sixty days.368
The court went on to determine that the degree of discretion
accorded to the Government on judicial review by the statutory language
was inconsistent with the First Amendment. 369 To accept conclusory
affirmations by the Government would "'cast Article III judges in the
role of petty functionaries, persons required to enter as a court judgment
an executive officer's decision, but stripped of capacity to evaluate
independently whether the executive's decision is correct."'' 370 Instead,
the Government must provide the court with an indication of the
apprehended harm and provide a basis on which the court (perhaps
based on in camera inspections) can determine that the link between
disclosure and the risk of harm is substantial.3 7 The Sullivan balancing
analysis of the potential harm against the particular First Amendment
interest raised by a particular challenge was central to both the District
Court's and the Second Circuit's consideration of the case. 372
legislate." Id. at 876.
364. 380 U.S. 51 (1965).
365. Id. at 59 (finding that the censor must, "within a specified brief period of time,
either issue the license or go to court to restrain showing the film").

366.
367.
368.

369.

Mukasey, 549 F.3d at 879.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 881.

370. Mukasey, 549 F.3d at 881 (quoting Gutierrez de Martinez v. Lamagno, 515 U.S.
417, 426 (1995)).
371. Id.
372. See id. at 882. The German Constitutional Court went a step beyond that taken by
the Second Circuit. In connection with a secret surveillance program dating back to W WII,
the court held that after surveillance has ended, the government must notify the target of the
surveillance. Klass v. Germany, 28 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1977); Allen Shoenberger, Privacy
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F. Should There be Different Standardsfor Defamation Cases Involving
Civil Servants?
The ECHR has applied a different standard when reviewing
defamation cases involving civil servants acting in their official capacity
from the standard it applies for politicians. For example, while the
ECHR subjects politicians to wider limits of acceptable criticism than
private individuals, 373 "it cannot be said that civil servants knowingly
lay themselves open to close scrutiny of their every word and deed to the
extent politicians do."' 374 Thus, while civil servants are subjected to
wider limits than private citizens, 375 they should not be treated on an
equal footing with politicians when it comes to criticism. 376 "[C]ivil
servants must enjoy public confidence in conditions free of undue
perturbation if they are to be successful in performing their tasks and it
may therefore prove necessary to protect them from offensive and
abusive verbal attacks when on duty. 377
In drawing this distinction, the ECHR appears to have considered it
significant that abusive language directed at law-enforcement officials
occurred in a public place in front of bystanders. 378 In Janowski v.
Poland,379 a journalist observed police ordering street vendors to leave a
municipal square and intervened by informing the guards they had no
authority to act. 380 During the altercation, he described the guards as
"ignorant," "dumb," and "oafs.", 38' For the verbal insult, the journalist
was criminally convicted of hooliganism and sentenced to imprisonment

Wars: EU Versus US: Scattered Skirmishes, Storm Clouds Ahead, 17 IND. INT'L & CoMP. L.
REv. 355, 370-75 (2007).
373. See Thoma v. Luxembourg, 200 1-II Eur. Ct. H.R. 67, 84,147 (finding that "[c]ivil
servants acting in an official capacity are, like politicians, subject to wider limits of acceptable

criticisms than private individuals"); Janowski v. Poland, 1999-I Eur. Ct. H.R. 187, 200-01,
33 (2000) (finding that "civil servants acting in an official capacity are, like politicians,
subject to the wider limits of acceptable criticism"); Oberschlick v. Austria, 1997-IV Eur. Ct.
H.R. 1266, 1275, 29 (finding wider "limits of acceptable criticism ...with regard to a
politician acting in his public capacity than in relation to a private individual").
374. Pedersen v. Denmark, 2004-XI Eur. Ct. H.R. 105, 139, 80 (citing Oberschlick v.
Austria, 1997-IV Eur. Ct. H.R. 1266, 1275, 29).
375. Id.
376. Id; Thoma, 2001-III Eur. Ct. H.R. at 84, T 47.
377. Janowski, 1999-I Eur. Ct. H.R.at 200-01, 733.
378. Id.at201,734.
379. 1999-I Eur. Ct. H.R. 187.
380. Id. at 193,78.
381. Id.
at 194-95,T7 11, 14.
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for eight months, suspended for two years, and fined.382 On appeal,
although the imprisonment sentence was quashed and the fine was
reduced, the criminal conviction was upheld.383 The ECHR found no
violation of Article 10 by a vote of twelve to five. 384
Dissenting judges collectively issued four separate dissenting
opinions, with the core of two opinions being that the police officers had
385
been engaged in actions that constituted abuses of their authority.
Judge Wildhaber in a single paragraph dissent states: "[T]he applicant
used only two moderately insulting words.., to defend a position which
was legally correct ....
The final dissenter, Judge Casadevall,
objected in particular to the government's position that "it is
irrelevant.., whether a civil servant was substantively right or wrong in
undertaking a specific action within his official duties. 387 He further
stated, "[a]rbitrary conduct cannot be protected," and concluded that, "in
spite of the fact that a few of the remarks he made were unfortunately
388
chosen-he was right about the substantive legal point at issue."
Similarly, in Pedersen v. Denmark,389 the criminal defamation
convictions of two television journalists-with orders to pay twenty-day
fines of DKK 400 (or twenty days imprisonment in default) and
compensation of DKK 100,000 to the estate of the deceased Chief
Superintendent-were sustained and found not to violate Article 10.390
After detailed examination of the evidence, the ECHR determined that
there was inadequate evidence to base a broadcasted allegation that the
Chief Superintendent "deliberately suppressed a vital piece of evidence
in the murder case., 391 Following the airing of the television stories, the
person originally convicted of murder was subsequently retried and
382.
383.

Id.at 194, 10.
Janowski, 1999-I Eur. Ct. H.R. at 194-95,
12-14.
384. Id. at 201-02, 35.
385. "The applicant was . . . amply justified in exercising his freedom of expression in
remonstrating with the municipal guards." Id. at 205 (Bratza, J. and Rozakis, J., dissenting).
"I harbour... scruples in endorsing the protection of public officers in the course of an abuse
of power." Id. at 207 (Bonello, J., dissenting).
386. Janowski, 1999-I Eur. Ct. H.R. at 203 (Wildhaber, J., dissenting).
387. Id. at 209 (Casadevall, J., dissenting) (omission in original) (internal quotations
omitted).
388. Id.at 210.
389. 2004-XI Eur. Ct. H.R. 105.
390. Id. at 143-44,
93, 95. The day fines were approximately 1078 Euros, and the
compensation to the estate approximately 13,469 Euros. Id. at 143-44, 93. "The court does
not find these penalties excessive in the circumstances or to be of such a kind as to have a
'chilling effect' on the exercise of media freedom." Id. at 144, 93.
391.
Pedersen,2004-XI Eur. Ct. H.R. at 143, 92.
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acquitted by a jury.392
As Janowski and Pedersen demonstrate, the ECHR generally
applies a "middle level standard of scrutiny" to permit the application of
penalties for modest insults or defamatory statements regarding civil
servants. The ECHR does not, however, sustain penalties in all such
cases, especially when the case involves insulting or defamatory
statements about lower level government officials. For example, in
Thoma v. Luxembourg393 the ECHR found it inappropriate under Article
10 to sanction a journalist for an article 394 that quoted another person
stating that "I know of only one person who is incorruptible,"
referencing Forestry Commission employees.39 5 Similarly, in Savitchi v.
Moldova,396 the ECHR held that a journalist, found responsible for
defamation of police officers in their treatment of an automobile driver
involved in an accident, had her Article 10 right violated. 397 The ECHR,
in particular, distinguished the case from Janowski stating that398the
language used "cannot be characterized as 'offensive and abusive.'
Similarly, in Nikula v. Finland,399 the ECHR found that a courtappointed defense attorney, convicted on a private prosecution for
criminal defamation of a prosecuting attorney, had been deprived of her
rights under Article 10. 4 00 Indeed, the court effectively turned the
Janowski principle on its head, for the applicant had argued that she, as
defense counsel, should be afforded far-reaching freedom of
expression. 40 ' Although the ECHR purported to consider the application
of Janowski,402 it in fact stated that "only in exceptional cases...
[would] restriction---even by way of a lenient criminal penalty--of
defence [sic] counsel's freedom of expression . . . be accepted as
necessary in a democratic society. 4 °3
392. Id. at 118-19, 9 24-26. The defendant had already been released on probation from
the original conviction. Id. at 113, T 10.
393. 2001-111Eur. Ct. H.R. 67.
394. Id. at 88, 9 64-66.
395. Id at 75, 11. Subsequently, fifty-four forest wardens and nine forestry engineers
brought civil suits against the journalist. Id. at 76, 17. The ECHR awarded pecuniary
damage of LUF 741,440, and costs of LUF 600,000. Thoma, 2001-II Eur. Ct. H.R. 67, 8990, 9 72, 77.
396. App. No. 11039/02 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Nov. 1, 2006), http://www.echr.coe.int.
397. Id. T9 15, 59-60.
398. Id 952.
399. 2002-Il Eur. Ct. H.R. 291.
400. Id. at 312-13, 99 55-56.
401. Id. at 300, T 15.
402. Id. at 310-11, 48.
403. Nikula, 2002-1I Eur. Ct. H.R. at 312, 55.
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To be sure, the principle announced in the Janowski judgment is
one that the ECHR has declined to extend too far beyond lawenforcement officers or prosecutors. "[I]t would go too far to extend the
Janowski principle to all persons who are employed by the states or by
state-owned companies ....
The court did not elaborate further on
why it thought it improper to extend Janowski.
It is worth speculating what other civil servants might become
subject to the Janowski approach in the ECHR. One factor that might be
considered relevant is that lower level civil servants seldom have the
practical access to the media that politicians and high-level civil servants
normally enjoy. Thus, a defamation action may be the only effective
method of responding to a character attack.
While no special standard of review ostensibly applies to middle
level civil servants under the jurisprudence of the United States Supreme
Court, one might reconsider a number of Supreme Court cases in the
light of the ECHR treatment. For example, the original "fighting words"
case involved a Jehovah's Witness calling a city marshal a "damned
Fascist" and "God damned racketeer., 40 5 While the conviction,
sustained for addressing "offensive, derisive or annoying word to any
other person [in public], 40 6 did not amount to prosecution for criminal
libel, the fact is that the statements might very well be prosecuted in
Europe today as criminal libel. Such language, given its intemperance,
might very well support a valid conviction in the face of Article 10 and
ECHR jurisprudence. The fact that the speaker addressed the language
to a city marshal would figure prominently in any analysis.
Similarly, in Colten v. Kentucky,4 °7 the Supreme Court sustained a
criminal conviction for disobeying police orders to move on, when the
accused wished to observe the police giving a traffic ticket to a friend.40 8
The criminal statute at issue did not address criminal libel, but rather
made action disorderly conduct "if, with intent to cause public
inconvenience, annoyance or alarm, or recklessly creating a risk thereof
[a person] . . . [c]ongregates with other persons in a public place and
refuses to comply with a lawful order of the police to disperse. 40 9 The
defendant testified that he wanted to make a transportation arrangement

404.
405.
406.
407.
408.
409.

Busuioc v. Moldova, App. No. 61513/00, 42 Eur. H.R. Rep. 252, 268,
Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 569 (1942).
Id. at 569 (internal quotations omitted).
407 U.S. 104 (1972).
Id.at 109.
Id. at 108 (internal quotations omitted).
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for his friend because he understood that the friend's car was about to be
towed away. 410 The Supreme Court opined that fairness was satisfied by
the order to disperse, so as to account for vagueness or over breadth
problems.4al While the arrest was not for speech, it was for assembly
(another First Amendment interest), with the intent of engaging in a
discussion.
The resulting decision is consistent with ECHR
jurisprudence granting a degree of deference to street-level police
officials.
By contrast, the Supreme Court, in Gooding v. Wilson,412 agreed
with the overturning of a conviction for speech found offensive by a
police officer during a picketing protest against the war in Vietnam.4 13
While the underlying statute criminalized the use of "opprobrious words
and abusive language,, 4 14 the state courts had not limited the
construction of the statute to apply only to fighting words for which
411
Chaplinsky permitted conviction.
There are limits in U.S.
jurisprudence to deference to street-level, police determinations.4 16
In short, Supreme Court jurisprudence may reflect results that are
somewhat more protective of street-level police officers against speech
directed against them, but such protection has its limits, for the Court
values the First Amendment. Whether the Court should address the
issue of a different standard of review for speech in such contacts with
authorities has not been specifically addressed. A different standard
makes some sense; specifically, a standard more protective of
individuals who have not opened themselves up to the level of public
invective that elected officials contemplate, and individuals who, as
well, lack the practical ability to respond through media or otherwise to
criticism and/or invective.
G. Should Defamation of a Religion Be Recognized?
The Human Rights Council of the United Nations recently adopted
a resolution expressing deep concern with the negative stereotyping and

410.
411.

Id.at 107.
Colten, 407 U.S. at 10-11.

412.

405 U.S. 518 (1972).

413. Id.at 520 n.1, 528.
414. Id.at 518.
415. See id.at 524.
416. See City of Houston v. Hill, 482 U.S. 451 (1987) (finding a municipal ordinance,
which made it unlawful to interrupt police officers in the performance of their duties, an
unconstitutionally overbroad infringement on First Amendment rights).
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defamation of religions. 41 7 Defamation of religions is a strange concept
to American ears. Defamation normally implicates defamation of a
particular person or small group of persons. Group defamation cases are
seldom brought, although they do exist. At the United States Supreme
Court level, the last such case in which "group defamation" was
sustained, was the "group libel" decision of Beauharnais v. Illinois
decided in 1952.418
The Beuaharnais decision sustained the application of a statute
criminalizing the exhibition of any lithograph, which portrayed lack of
virtue of a class of citizens. 41 9 The Illinois statute at issue criminalized
publications which, "portrays depravity, criminality, unchastity, or lack
of virtue of a class of citizens, of any race, color, creed or religion which
said publication . . . exposes the citizens of any race, color, creed or
religion to contempt, derision,
or obloquy or which is productive of
420
breach of the peace or riots.
The Illinois Supreme Court described the statute as a form of
criminal libel law. 42 1 The Illinois Supreme Court characterized the
words prohibited by the statute as those "liable to cause violence and
disorder., 422 The lithograph at issue was published by the White Circle
League, a group of white citizens opposed to the white race becoming
"mongrelized by the negro. 4 23 Among other contents, the "negro" was
accused of "aggressions . . . rapes, robberies, knives, guns and
marijuana" and the "further encroachment, harassment and invasion of
white people, their property, neighborhoods and persons" was
condemned.424 The Supreme Court pointed out that at the time of the

417.

UNITED NATIONS

HUMAN

RIGHTS COUNCIL

COMBATING

DEFAMATION

OF

RELIGIONS
(2009),
available
at
http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/hrcouncil/docs/lOsession/UneditedversionL. 1IRevise
d.doc.
Voting against the resolution were Canada, Chile, France, Germany, Italy,
Netherlands, Slovakia, Slovenia, Switzerland, Ukraine, and the United Kingdom. 1d. Not one
European country voted for the resolution. Id.
418. 343 U.S. 250 (1952). Subsequent decisions by the Supreme Court have been read
by various United States Courts of Appeals as substantially undercutting the Beauharnais
decision. See Dworkin v. Hustler Magazine Inc., 867 F.2d 1188, 1200 (9th Cir. 1989) (citing
Seventh Circuit decisions); American Booksellers Ass'n., Inc. v. Hudnut, 771 F.2d 323, 332
n.3 (7th Cir. 1985); Collin v. Smith, 578 F.2d 1197, 1205 (7th Cir. 1978).
419. Beauharnais,343 U.S. at 251, 253.
420. Id.at 251.
421.
People v. Beauharnais, 97 N.E.2d 343, 346 (Ill. 1951). The penalty was a $200 fine.
Id.at 345.
422. Beauharnais,343 U.S. at 254.
423. Id. at 252.
424. Id. (omission in original).
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Beauharnais decision each of the forty-eight states, the District of
Columbia, Alaska, Hawaii, and Puerto Rico punished libels directed at
individuals.42 5 The issue of whether libel of a group was permissible
was the central issue for the Supreme Court.426 The court permitted
such criminal statutes unless it was able to find the statute a "willful and
purposeless restriction unrelated to the peace and well-being of the
State., 427 In that context, the Supreme Court referenced the tragic
experience in Illinois of race riots over three decades, including the
Cicero riots of 195 1.428 In each of these cases, the Court observed that
utterances of the nature at issue in the Beauharnais case played a
significant part-in one case stimulating riots so violent and bloody in
East St. Louis just before enactment of the Illinois statute that a
Congressional investigation resulted.4 29
While various Courts of Appeals in the United States have
indicated they doubt the current validity of the Beauharnais decision,
particularly considering Sullivan, the Supreme Court has never overruled
Beauharnais.
The ECHR has not squarely dealt with a "defamation of religion"
case, but its decision regarding a "blasphemy" statute in Wingrove v.
430eatwtthreul
UnitedKingdom is worth examining.
Wingrove dealt with the refusal
of a "classification certificate" to permit sales of a video, Visions of
Ecstasy, an eighteen-minute film depicting St. Teresa of Avila, a
sixteenth century Carmelite nun and founder of many convents. 43 1 The
British Board of Film Classification rejected a request for a classification
certificate, citing in its rejection the criminal law of blasphemy.432 The
British blasphemy statute defined blasphemy as:
"[A]ny contemptuous, reviling, scurrilous or ludicrous matter relating to God,
Jesus Christ or the Bible ....
It is not blasphemous to speak or publish
opinions hostile to the Christian religion" if the publication is "decent and
temperate." The question is ... one of the... "manner [of expression], i.e.

425.

Id.at 255.

426.

Beauharnais,343 U.S. at 258.

427.
428.
429.

Id.
Id.at 259.
Id. at 259-260.

430.
431.
432.

1996-V Eur. Ct. H.R. 1937.
Id. at 1942-43,
8-9, 13.
Id. at 1943,
12-13. The denial prevented marketing the video in the U.K. Id. at

1944,

13.
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"the tone, style and spirit," in which [the material] is presented.

The video at issue presents a figure of St Teresa, a saint who
experienced powerful ecstatic visions, "writhing in exquisite erotic
sensation" and eventually sitting astride the prone body of Christ,
"seemingly naked under her habit," and writhing "in a motion reflecting
intense erotic arousal. 434 At one point, the video depicts an apparent
lesbian relationship in a graphic manner.43 5
The ECHR found that "the law of blasphemy only protects the
Christian religion," and does not extend to other religions.436 The
British government had considered amending the law of blasphemy to
take books such as the Satanic Verses outside the boundary of what is
legally acceptable, but declined to do so for a variety of reasons,
including consideration of whether it was not preferable to repeal the
law.437 The law was repealed, but only in 2008.438
The applicant in the ECHR challenged the denial of a classification
certificate on the ground that it violated the freedom of expression
protected by Article 10 of the European Convention on Human
Rights. 43 9 The ECHR indicated that it viewed the video itself and was
"satisfied that the applicant could reasonably have foreseen with
appropriate legal advice that the film .. could fall within the category
of the offence of blasphemy., 440 The ECHR thus found that the law
adequately prescribed the interference with freedom of expression.44 1
The ECHR then found that the blasphemy statute, which aimed at
preventing justified indignation among believing Christians pursued a
legitimate aim in protecting the "right of citizens not to be insulted in
their religious feelings. 442
The ECHR then found the restriction "necessary in a democratic
433.
434.

Wingrove, 1996-V Eur. Ct. H.R. at 1944,
Id. at 1942, 9.

435.

Id.

13 (first omission in original).

436. Id.at 1951,728.
437.
Wingrove, 1996-V Eur. Ct. H.R. at 1951,
29 (alternation in original). This
consideration took place during 1989 and culminated with a letter from the Minister of State
at the Home Department to a number of influential British Muslims on July 4, 1989. Id.
438. Criminal Justice and Immigration Act, 2008, c. 4, § 79 (Eng.). On May 8 2008, the
Criminal Justice and Immigration Act abolished the common law offenses of blasphemy and
blasphemous libel in England and Wales, with effect from July 8, 2008. Id.
439. Wingrove, 1996-V Eur. Ct. H.R. at 1952, 32.
440. Id. at 1944, 43. Interesting that both ECHR and the United States Supreme Court
on occasion themselves view "raw" films as a judicial function.
441.
Id.at 1955, 44.

442.

Id.at 1955, 47.
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society. 443 In that context, it noted that "blasphemy legislation [was]
still in force in various European countries," although the application of
such laws was increasingly rare. 4 " In the United Kingdom only two
prosecutions had been brought in the last seventy years.445 Moreover, it
considered the ECHR concept of a margin of appreciation, (another
description for degree of deference) and concluded that a wider margin
was appropriate when relating "to matters liable to offend intimate
personal convictions within the sphere of morals or, especially,
religion., 446 The ECHR then considered that it was the manner of the
speech that the law sought to control, not the expression of views
contrary to the Christian religion, and considering the manner of the
video in question,447 which the court reiterated it had viewed,44 8 the
court concluded the authorities had not overstepped their margin of
appreciation.44 9
What then, can one conclude about the law of defamation of
religion in the United States and Europe? The crystal ball is certainly
occluded. Neither the ECHR nor the United States Supreme Court has
squarely condemned the concept. When public safety and order are at
issue, whether public order is threatened by race riots or religious riots,
one might anticipate that either or both courts might well reach a similar
result, despite the fact that eight member countries of the Council of
Europe voted against the Human Rights Council resolution condemning
religious defamation.45°
IV. CONCLUSION

One may approach the defamation related jurisprudence of the
ECHR with the oft quoted words of Patrick Henry, "Give me liberty or

443. Wingrove, 1996-V Eur. Ct. H.R. at 1960, 9 65.
444. Id. at 1957, T 57.
445. Id.
446. Id. at 1958, 9 58. The ECHR noted that there is "little scope" for a margin of
appreciation for restrictions on political speech or on questions of public interest. Wingrove,
1996-V Eur. Ct. H.R. at 1957, 58.
447. Id. at 1958, 60.
448. Id. at 1959, 60.
449. Id. at 1060,164.
450. UNITED NATIONS HUMAN RIGHTS COUNCIL, supra note 417. France, Germany,
Italy, Netherlands, Slovakia, Slovenia, Switzerland, Ukraine, and the U.K. Id. In addition,
Canada and Chile voted against the resolution. Id. Countries abstaining include: Argentina,
Brazil, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Burkina Faso, Ghana, India, Japan, Madagascar, Mauritius,
Mexico, Republic of Korea, Uruguay, and Zambia. Id.
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Give me death," in mind. 451 The ECHR values speech in many ways
and in similar manners to the way in which the United States Supreme
Court exemplifies American values of free speech. There are, however,
differences.
The ECHR routinely, itself, weighs and evaluates the facts of the
alleged defamatory statement. The U.S. Supreme Court did so in New
York Times Co. v. Sullivan, but such evaluation by the U.S. Supreme
Court is infrequent, and usually not as intense a review as ordinarily
exercised by the ECHR. Since appellate courts are ordinarily in as good
a position as the trial court to evaluate the "facts" of defamation, perhaps
such judicial valuation should be more frequent, if not routine.
Not only does it matter to the ECHR what job level a public official
holds in valuing speech, it matters whether the speech is opinion,
unbacked by adequate justification. Would it not be a good idea to
require even opinion to have factual backing? Such a requirement might
curtail some of the most outrageous of the talk radio diatribes against
public officials, and perhaps improve the level of public debate,
ultimately encouraging more members of the public to seek elective or
appointive office.
Criminal defamation has not been completely rejected by the
ECHR, but it is certainly circumscribed, particularly with respect to the
nature and level of permissible penalties that may be assessed.
The idea that court-appointed counsel for indigent defamation
defendants may be necessary to adequately protect First Amendment
interests implicated by public interest groups such as Greenpeace, Save
the Whales, or Mothers Against Drunk Driving, deserves serious
consideration. Many of the issues raised in the Greenpeace pamphlet
regarding McDonald's are serious issues indeed. If large, deep-pocketed
entities are able to silence potential critics of their conduct by the threat
or actuality of defamation suits, that raises very serious First
Amendment concerns.
In all of this, it is submitted, the jurisprudence of the ECHR is
worthy of serious consideration.

451.
Patrick Henry, Speech Before the Virginia Convention of Delegates (Mar. 23,
1775), in THE WORLD'S GREATEST SPEEcHES 232 (Copeland, et al., eds. 1999).
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